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PREFACE 
This is the ninth of a series of Working Papers prepared for the Pro-Poor Livestock 
Policy Initiative (PPLPI). The purpose of these papers is to explore issues related to 
livestock development in the context of poverty alleviation. 
Livestock is vital to the economies of many developing countries.  Animals are a 
source of food, more specifically protein for human diets, income, employment and 
possibly foreign exchange. For low income producers, livestock can serve as a store of 
wealth, provide draught power and organic fertiliser for crop production and a means 
of transport. Consumption of livestock and livestock products in developing countries, 
though starting from a low base, is growing rapidly.   
This paper analyzes the political economy of the livestock sector in two Indian states, 
Andhra Pradesh and Orissa.  The aim is to identify politically feasible interventions 
that could have broad positive effects on poor rural livestock producers in these 
states.  To that end, the paper assesses the relationship between land, livestock, and 
poverty, describes the organization of the sector, and analyzes the political and 
bureaucratic interests shaping livestock policy. 
We hope this paper will provide useful information to its readers and any feedback is 
welcome by the author, PPLPI and the Livestock Information, Sector Analysis and 
Policy Branch (AGAL) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
Disclaimer 
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not 
imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any 
country, territory, city or area or its authorities or concerning the delimitations of its 
frontiers or boundaries. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author(s) and 
do not constitute in any way the official position of the FAO. 
Author 
Robin L. Turner, under the direction of David K. Leonard. Institute of International 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This paper analyzes the political economy of the livestock sector in two Indian states, 
Andhra Pradesh and Orissa.  The aim is to identify politically feasible interventions 
that could have broad positive effects on poor rural livestock producers in these 
states. To that end, the paper assesses the relationship between land, livestock, and 
poverty, describes the organization of the sector, and analyzes the political and 
bureaucratic interests shaping livestock policy. 
A review of available data on livestock ownership, land, and poverty shows that 
sectoral interventions must be carefully tailored to have pro-poor effects.  Although 
livestock holdings are widely distributed in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, as elsewhere in 
India, land ownership and livestock holdings are correlated.  Poor livestock producers 
tend to own little or no land; these producers are often of low social status as well.  
Smallholders and landless households differ from other households in the mix of 
animals that they own and their means of supporting these animals.  Poor livestock 
producers own fewer large ruminants (cows and buffaloes); they are more likely to 
possess small ruminants (goats and sheep) and backyard poultry.  Poor producers are 
also more heavily dependent on common property resources—village pastures, water 
tanks, and local forests—for the feed and fodder their animals need. 
The distribution of benefits from sectoral interventions is shaped by these factors.  
The impact of a dairy sector intervention will depend upon the resources required to 
benefit from it; poor producers are unlikely to benefit from an intervention that  
requires land or financial resources.  For example, improvements in the functioning of 
dairy cooperatives benefit all producers who own dairy animals.  Provision of fodder 
seeds, on the other hand, is likely to benefit only those with arable land in which to 
sow the seeds.  Measures that improve common resources or focus on small ruminants 
are likely to benefit poor producers. 
Livestock policy options are constrained by the broader political context.  Because 
livestock producers are not an organized political lobby, policy in this area is shaped 
by broad policy trends and the agendas of more organized groups.  Historically, 
livestock sector policy has focused on large ruminants and the state has sought to 
deliver necessary supportive services.  This approach follows from the high political 
salience of Hindu nationalism and a deeply embedded statist approach to policy in the 
post-Independence period.  Hindu nationalist groups have encouraged emphasis on 
vegetarian-friendly livestock policies—promote dairy rather than meat—and placed 
constraints on cow slaughter.  Statist beliefs led the state to view provision of animal 
health and breeding services as a state responsibility and facilitated direct 
intervention in the cooperative sector.  Recent sector reform policies reflect the 
broad ideological shift towards liberalism of the last decade.  Reforms have opened 
the formal dairy market to private companies and imposed user charges for health 
services.  Reformers also seek to reduce government involvement in cooperatives and 
propose to privatize veterinary practice.  Such reforms place greater faith in the 
ability of the market to allocate services and goods.  It is argued that reform 
implementation will be shaped by interested actors, such as state-employed 
veterinarians, as well as market forces.  Other policy trends, such as forest closure 
and decentralization, have affected the livestock sector.  All of these reforms will 
affect poor livestock producers—the paper discusses the likely effect of each reform—, 
but livestock producers have played little role in their development.  However, those 
cases in which livestock sector actors have organized, as in the case of sheep and goat 
rearers in Andhra Pradesh and dairy cooperative sector leaders at the national level, 
demonstrate that actors can influence the content and implementation of sector 
policy within the broad constraints set by the political context. 
Based on this analysis, the paper discusses several options for strategic intervention in 
the livestock sector.  The interventions with the greatest potential are the following.  
Executive summary 
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One, actors can seek to improve producers’ capacity to articulate and advocate their 
interests.  Two, actors can seek to increase access to shared resources such as forests 
and pastures.  Three, actors can encourage pro-poor implementation of animal health 
service reforms.  Four, actors can advocate further liberalization of the dairy sector.  
Five, actors can support small ruminant production by improving feed and fodder and 
conducting research on commodity chains and breeding. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The livestock sector has significant potential for improving the livelihoods of landless 
people and small and marginal farmers, who comprise the majority of India’s rural 
poor.  Many poor rural Indians own livestock and gain some income from it.  At 
present, resource and institutional constraints prevent poor producers from realizing 
the full potential of their animals.  Expansion in the domestic livestock products 
market presents an opportunity for gain. Forecasters believe that domestic demand 
for dairy and meat products will grow substantially in the near future (Delgado et al. 
1999). Strategic intervention is required to ensure that poor producers secure a 
greater share of the benefits from this expanding market. 
This paper analyzes the livestock sector in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, situating these 
cases in the national context.  These states were selected because they are actively 
pursuing sectoral development and reform; they do not represent the full diversity of 
India’s livestock production systems, agroclimatic conditions, or political 
environments and are not meant to be representative in this sense.1  Close attention 
to these cases can contribute to effective interventions in these states and elsewhere 
in India.  Dairy and meat marketing, fodder and grazing issues, and animal health 
services are relevant throughout India.  The analysis focuses on poor rural livestock 
producers; this paper does not investigate the impact of policies on livestock 
consumers or peri-urban livestock producers.   
Throughout, the paper highlights key factors affecting the political, social, and 
economic environment in which poor rural livestock producers attempt to secure a 
livelihood.  The central concern is the interaction between the animals producers 
raise—cows, buffaloes, sheep, goats, poultry—and their environment rather than on 
divisions among poor producers.2  The aim is to identify leverage points with potential 
for broad positive effects on poor producers.  Thus, the analysis presents broad 
generalizations regarding issues such as caste, land ownership, and local politics.  
Although little space is devoted to the complexities of these issues, the analysis seeks 
to be sensitive to the differential policy effects that may arise from characteristics 
such as remote location or social disadvantage. 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section I provides an overview of the relationship 
between land, livestock, and poverty in India, Andhra Pradesh, and Orissa.  This 
overview highlights the two parts of the sector with greatest potential for pro-poor 
interventions: dairy and small ruminant meat production.  Section II provides an 
overview of the livestock sector.  The political context surrounding livestock policy is 
discussed, highlighting constraints imposed by ‘cow’ politics, and the dominant policy 
approach and the organization of service delivery, processing, and marketing to 1991 
are described.  The actors and interests served by that system are identified.  Section 
III focuses on sector reform efforts since 1991, the year in which the Government of 
India committed the country to market liberalization.  Recent reform efforts in India, 
Andhra Pradesh, and Orissa are summarized, implementation prospects are analyzed, 
and their potential impact on poor livestock producers is evaluated.  Because there 
are important linkages between state and national reforms, the discussion is ordered 
by theme rather than state or level of government.   The concluding section reviews 
several options for strategic intervention, describing and analyzing their prospects. It 
is recommended that actors focus on improving producers’ capacity to articulate and 
advocate their interests, increasing access to shared resources such as forests and 
pastures, encouraging pro-poor implementation of animal health service reforms, 
advocating further liberalization of the dairy sector, and gathering information on 
small ruminant commodity chains and breeding. 
                                                 
1 Andhra Pradesh and Orissa are neighbouring states in eastern India.   
2 This paper does not analyze the distribution of benefits or division of responsibilities within poor livestock 
producing households, and thus it neglects gender issues.  See the following for extensive discussion of these 
issues (Katticaren 2000; Bravo-Baumann 2000; Pradhan, Ahuja, and Venkatramaiah 2003; Ramdas and 
Seethalakshmi 1999). 
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SECTION I: LAND, LIVESTOCK, AND POVERTY IN INDIA, ANDHRA 
PRADESH AND ORISSA 
India has 36 percent of the poor people in the world.3  About 433 million Indians (44 
percent) lived on less than $1 a day in 1997 (World Development Indicators 2000).  
Official statistics classified roughly 36 percent of the population as poor in 1993-1994.   
Indian poverty is largely a rural phenomenon.  About 75 percent of the poor reside in 
rural areas (World Bank 2001).  Roughly 33 percent of rural residents were considered 
poor by the Government of India in 1991, as compared to 18 percent of urban 
residents (Drèze and Sen 1995).  Table 1 presents information on urban and rural 
poverty in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa.  Most locate the causes of rural poverty in slow 
agricultural growth rates, low factor productivity, and inequitable access to land and 
other inputs (Mearns 1999).   
Table 1: Poverty in Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. 
  % of individuals who are Head count ratio of poverty 
 # of 
households 
Scheduled 
Castes 
Scheduled 
Tribes All 
Scheduled 
Castes 
Scheduled 
Tribes 
Rural Andhra 
Pradesh 4,908 19.3 9.5 27.7 43.8 41.2 
Urban Andhra 
Pradesh 3,644 8.5 2.8 36.1 41.0 43.7 
Rural Orissa 3,338 18.5 25.2 51.9 57.2 76.9 
Urban Orissa 1,037 13.1 11.9 39.7 45.5 61.6 
Poverty rates are based on the official poverty line.  This poverty line is state-specific and is 
derived separately for rural and urban areas. 
Source: Household level data, 50th round of NSS Consumer Expenditure Survey 1993-94 (Meenakshi, Ray, 
and Gupta 2000).  
Rural poverty is closely linked to land ownership and to social status.  Approximately 
84 percent of rural Indian households operate less than 2 hectares of land; the other 
16 percent operate almost 66 percent of the land (See Table 2).4  Land may be 
distributed more inequitably than official figures suggest as some large landholders 
distributed formal ownership among family members to evade land ceilings.  Many 
households own too little productive land to rely solely on its products for subsistence.  
However, those households that manage to secure a livelihood from their land are less 
likely to be poor than those dependent on agriculture wage labour (Agarwal 1994).  
There is little reason to expect a dramatic shift in land distribution in the short term.   
                                                 
3 The figures reported in this paragraph are not wholly consistent.  Poverty figures depend on the measures 
used, the population sampled, and a host of other factors.  There is an active debate on appropriate measures 
and poverty trends in India.  
4 Of course, quantitative data on land ownership and operation tells us little of its quality; an acre of irrigated 
land and an acre of rain-fed land are not the same. 
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Table 2: Rural land ownership. 
Percentage distribution of households and area operated by size class of operational holdings 
India Andhra Pradesh Orissa  
Percent of 
households 
Percent of 
operated 
area 
Percent of 
households 
Percent of 
operated 
area 
Percent of 
households 
Percent of 
operated 
area 
Landless  
(0-.002 ha) 21.8 - 37.5 - 27.2 - 
Marginal  
(.002-1 ha) 48.3 15.5 36.9 17.5 43.5 22.0 
Small (1-2 ha) 14.2 18.6 13.3 23.0 17.9 30.3 
Semi-Medium  
(2-4 ha) 9.7 24.2 8.4 26.5 8.8 27.8 
Medium (4-10 ha) 4.9 26.5 3.4 23.6 2.5 16.3 
Large (>10 ha) 1.1 15.2 0.5 9.5 0.2 3.7 
Source: 48th NSS Land and Livestock holdings survey, 1991-1992 (National Sample Survey Organisation. 
Department of Statistics. Government of India. 1997). 
Table 1 presents information on the relationship between social status and poverty.  
Low caste and out caste status continues to be correlated with poverty.  The 
populations of Andhra Pradesh and Orissa comprise a substantial proportion of dalits 
(scheduled castes) and advivasis (scheduled tribes).5  Dalits are present in most 
districts, but adivasis are concentrated in the forest, mountainous, and remote areas.  
Much of the land in which adivasis reside is owned by the state, at least formally, or 
controlled by non-adivasis (Mohanty 1997).  Thus, producers in these areas do not 
have full control over the land used for livestock production.  The 1991 census listed 
62 distinct adivasi groups in Orissa.  Although the table does not provide data on 
nomadic communities, informants indicated that there are pastoralist and 
sedentarized communities in Andhra Pradesh.  Pastoralists tend to possess a greater 
number of livestock per capita than other groups.  Pastoralist communities often lack 
political influence, but they are not necessarily poor by standard measures (Agrawal 
1999).   
For the most part, land ownership and social caste continue to serve as indicators of 
political influence or lack thereof.  Despite increased mobilization by dalits and 
adivasis in recent decades, research in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa indicates that large 
land owners and upper caste individuals continue to exert disproportionate influence 
in local, district, and state level decisions (Reddy 1989; Manor 2000; Mohanty 1996).  
Poor rural livestock producers tend to own little arable land and often come from 
socially marginalized groups.   
Both land ownership and social caste are relevant to livestock production.  The 
amount of land one owns affects one’s ability to support livestock.  Those with ample 
private lands have greater crop residues and may be able to raise fodder crops.  Most 
producers, however, depend partially or wholly on crop residues and common 
property resources—such as village pastures, tanks, and local forests.  Jodha’s classic 
study found that 84 to 100 percent of poor households in dry regions were dependent 
                                                 
5 The terms Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe are used to refer to those historically marginalized groups 
that are granted special protections in the Constitution.  Scheduled castes refers to “untouchables” and 
scheduled tribes refers to “tribal” peoples. Dalit and adivasi are the terms contemporary representatives of 
these groups use most frequently. 
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on common property resources (CPRs) for food, fuel, fodder, and fibre while only 10 
to 28 percent of large farmers gathered these items from common areas (Jodha 1986).  
Animal grazing in CPRs accounted for 69 to 89 percent of grazing for livestock owned 
by poor households and 11 to 42 percent of grazing from rich households.  That study, 
and many others, also found that the quantity and quality of common lands has 
declined substantially since Independence.   
Social caste affects livestock production by constraining access to services and 
resources.  Higher caste individuals are frequently unwilling to provide services to 
low/out-caste livestock producers because contact with “untouchables” is perceived 
to pollute oneself.  However, out-caste individuals may provide services to higher 
caste individuals if they observe proper protocol.  Ethnicity may also influence dietary 
practices and thus local markets.  Informants indicated that adivasis in Orissa were 
generally non-vegetarian and consumed less milk than non-adivasis (Mittal et al. 
1999).  Thus, one would expect a stronger local market for meat in mostly adivasi 
areas.  The potential for dairy would depend on access to nonlocal markets but should 
be lower than in milk-consuming areas. 
Historically, livestock were integrated into a mixed agricultural-livestock system.  
Livestock tilled fields, fed on crop residues, and fertilized the fields with their 
manure; and provided milk and meat for household consumption, celebrations, and 
religious festivals.6  As farmers have become more integrated into markets, sale of 
livestock products has come to comprise a significant share of household incomes.  
Kurup (2003) estimates that livestock comprises 30 percent of household income in 
Orissa; agricultural or wage income remains primary for most.  Income from livestock 
can balance that from agriculture.  Agricultural income is episodic and depends on a 
successful season.  Dairy can provide regular income and meat animals provide a 
ready source of cash on demand. 
In 1999-2000, livestock comprised 5.5 percent of India’s gross domestic product 
(GDP).7  While this figure is dwarfed by the total contribution of agriculture (24.85 
percent), livestock’s share in the agricultural GDP has grown slightly over time.  The 
gross value of livestock sector output was about Rs. 130,234 crore; the GDP of the 
livestock GDP sector comprised Rs. 984 billion (roughly US$22.6 billion).8  Dairy 
products garner the greatest proportion of output value (64.6 percent); meat and 
meat products accounted for 18.5 percent of output value.  Other outputs include 
dung (8.6 percent), eggs (3.3 percent) and hair or fibre products (8.6 percent).  The 
majority of livestock products are consumed domestically.  In 1999-2000 livestock 
export earnings were only Rs. 2,000 crore (US$460 million).  Meat and meat products 
and leather and leather products comprise more than 90 percent of livestock sector 
exports.  Analyses indicate that substantial reductions in international trade barriers 
and improvements in domestic processes (disease control, packaging, etc) would be 
required for India to gain a larger share of world markets (Sharma and Sharma 2002; 
Sharma and Gulati 2003).  Small producers are unlikely to play a major role in 
production for export in the near term.9 
As Tables 3-10 demonstrate, livestock ownership is distributed less inequitably than 
arable land.  The majority of livestock are held by smallholders operating less than 2 
hectares of land.  Many landless households own some livestock.  However, there is a 
                                                 
6 Sale of animal fibres (wool) and skin (leather) is not an important source of income in Andhra Pradesh and 
Orissa.   
7 Sources: Website of the national Department of Animal Husbandry & Dairying (cited as GOI 2003b-d), Sharma 
and Sharma (2002), and GOI (2003a). 
This figure excludes animal (draught) power, which was valued at Rs. 4,000-9,500 crore (Government of India. 
Planning Commission 2002).  Some experts believe this figure to be low.  One crore = 10 million (10,000,000) 
8 As of January 1, 2000, US$1 = Rs. 45.98. 
9 Some dairy cooperatives, such as GCMMF market dairy products abroad.  However, these sales comprise a 
small share of their total earnings. 
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positive relationship between land and livestock ownership.  This pattern is most 
evident for large ruminants (cattle and buffalo).  A much smaller proportion of 
landless households than households with medium to large holdings had dairy animals 
that were giving milk during the 1993-1994 National Sample Survey (See Table 5).  
Inequity in large ruminants is less evident in Orissa than Andhra Pradesh.  There were 
at least 10 productive animals for every 100 households at every land possession 
category in Orissa while there were only 6 in-milk buffaloes for every 100 landless 
households in Andhra Pradesh. 
Goats are frequently referred to as “small man’s cow;” this label aptly reflects the 
profile of most goat owners, who possess, on average, less than a hectare of land per 
household.  The landless are better represented among sheep and goat producers than 
among dairy producers.  Reliance on sheep and goats may reflect a decline in the 
common resources on which landless households and smallholders depend; goats are 
able to survive on degraded land where cows would not survive (Jodha 1991).  The 
figures regarding poultry ownership should be treated with caution for it is not clear 
whether this data reflects the effects of the “poultry revolution” in which intensive 
poultry production became widespread. 
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Table 3: Land and livestock ownership in Indian rural areas. 
  Possession of milch animals Possession of draught animals  
  Cows 
only 
Buffalos 
only 
Cows & 
Buffalos Others None 
Not 
recorded 
A pair or 
more Single None 
Not 
recorded 
Landless (0-.01 ha) 7% 6% 1% 0% 82% 4% 1% 2% 96% 0% 
Marginal (.01-1.0 ha) 22% 15% 4% 0% 55% 4% 18% 9% 73% 0% 
Small  (1-2 ha) 33% 24% 9% 0% 31% 3% 43% 12% 45% 0% 
Semi-medium 
(2-4 ha) 32% 28% 14% 0% 23% 3% 51% 12% 37% 0% 
Medium & Large  
(4.01 + ha) 27% 28% 27% 0% 14% 4% 54% 14% 32% 0% 
All households 22% 16% 6% 0% 53% 4% 21% 8% 70% 0% 
Source: NSS 50th Round, Quinquennial survey of consumer expenditures. 
Table 4: Equity in livestock ownership in Orissa: Livestock ownership and land possession. 
Landholding Proportion of Households 
Proportion of 
Cattle 
Proportion 
of Buffalo 
Proportion of 
Sheep & Goat 
Proportion 
of Pigs 
Proportion of 
Poultry 
Landless 
(0-.002 ha) 27.2 8.62 0.00 25.08 0.00 44.66 
Marginal (.002-1 ha) 43.5 64.79 22.75 51.04 25.49 39.49 
Small 
(1-2 ha)l 17.9 17.73 28.57 11.37 31.37 8.01 
Semi-Medium (2-4 ha) 8.8 5.83 14.29 8.26 31.37 4.53 
Medium  (4-10 ha) 2.5 2.64 33.33 3.43 11.76 2.49 
Large  (>10 ha) 0.2 0.22 1.06 0.05 0.00 0.82 
Source: Land data is from 48th NSS Land and Livestock holdings survey. Livestock data are from Orissa LSR Field Survey 1999 (Kurup 2003). 
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Table 5: Ownership of productive dairy animals and rural land ownership.  
In-milk large ruminants owned per 100 households 
 Andhra Pradesh Orissa 
 Xbred 
Cows Desi Cows Buffalo 
Xbred 
Cows Desi Cows Buffalo 
Revised Landless - - 6 1 11 - 
Marginal 3 29 41 5 20 2 
Small (1-2) 2 20 55 3 39 3 
Semi-Medium (2-4) 3 28 56 7 26 2 
Medium (4-10) 5 18 74 6 42 11 
Large 4 16 126 0 69 0 
Source: 48th NSS Land and Livestock holdings survey, 1991-1992. 
 
Table 6: Ownership of productive cows and Rural Land Ownership in Andhra Pradesh. 
Adult female cows owned per 100 households 
 Not calved 
once In-milk Dry Others All 
Size Class of 
Household opera-
tional holding 
Xbred Desi Xbred Desi Xbred Desi   
Revised Landless 3 - - - - - 2 - 
Marginal 80 - - 3 29 3 10 2 
Small (1-2) 89 0 1 2 20 2 11 3 
Semi-Medium (2-4) 114 0 1 3 28 2 9 1 
Medium (4-10) 85 0 0 5 18 2 13 4 
Large 72 0 0 4 16 6 14 3 
Source: 48th NSS Land and Livestock holdings survey, 1991-1992. 
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Table 7: Ownership of productive cows and rural land ownership in Orissa. 
Adult female cows owned per 100 households 
Not calved once In-milk Dry Others All  
Xbred Desi Xbred Desi Xbred Desi   
Revised Landless 0 0 0.5 11 0.5 1.5 0.5 13.5 
Marginal 0 6 5 20 3 34 3.5 70.5 
Small (1-2) 0 4 3 39 2 56 3 108 
Semi-Medium (2-4) 0 3 7 26 5 39 6 86 
Medium (4-10) 2 0 6 42 9 52 6 118 
Large 0 0 0 69 0 95 75 239 
Source: 48th NSS Land and Livestock holdings survey, 1991-1992. 
 
Table 8:  Household possession of large ruminants in rural areas. 
  Possession of milch animals Possession of draught animals  
 Cows 
only 
Buffalos 
only 
Cows & 
Buffalos Others None 
Not 
recorded 
A pair or 
more Single None 
Not 
recorded 
All-India 22% 16% 6% 3% 53% 0% 21% 8% 70% 0% 
Andhra 
Pradesh 8% 17% 3% 0% 73% 0% 17% 4% 79% 0% 
Orissa 29% 2% 1% 1% 68% 0% 32% 8% 60% 0% 
Source: NSS 50th Round, Quinquennial survey of consumer expenditures. 
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Table 9: Selected household attributes and ownership of large ruminants in rural India. 
  Possession of milch animals Possession of Draught Animals  
  Cows 
only 
Buffalos 
only 
Cows & 
Buffalos Others None 
Not 
recorded 
A pair 
or more Single None 
Not 
recorded 
Agricultural 
Labour 16% 9% 2% 4% 68% 0% 10% 6% 84% 0% 
Self-employed 
in Agriculture 31% 27% 12% 3% 28% 0% 42% 12% 45% 0% 
Scheduled 
Tribes 26% 7% 4% 5% 59% 0% 35% 10% 56% 0% 
Scheduled 
Castes 19% 12% 3% 5% 61% 0% 13% 7% 80% 0% 
Source: NSS 50th Round, Quinquennial survey of consumer expenditures. 
 
Table 10: Small animals and rural land ownership. 
Animals owned per 100 households 
 Andhra Pradesh Orissa 
 Sheep & Goats Poultry Sheep & Goats Poultry 
Revised Landless 21 125 55 489 
Marginal 119 221 70 316 
Small (1-2) 145 191 75 312 
Semi-Medium (2-
4) 121 293 112 373 
Medium (4-10) 156 237 167 696 
Large 18 167 259 2642 
Source: 48th NSS Land and Livestock holdings survey, 1991-1992. 
Inequity in ownership of livestock has important implications for pro-poor 
interventions.  Because the majority of livestock are owned by small holders and 
landless people, almost any intervention that benefits livestock producers can be said 
to be pro-poor.  This view is often advanced in policy documents and was by several 
informants.  But it is not the case that all livestock producers will benefit equally from 
intervention.  Factors affecting the distribution of benefits from an intervention 
include the animals included, the risk involved, and the other inputs required to 
benefit from the intervention.  For example, improvements in the functioning of dairy 
cooperatives benefit all producers who own dairy animals.  Provision of fodder seeds, 
on the other hand, is likely to benefit only those with arable land in which to sow the 
seeds.10  The livestock most commonly raised in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa are 
discussed briefly in the paragraphs that follow.  
Animals differ substantially in the investment required and the potential profit.  Table 
11 provides information regarding local market prices in Orissa.  Large ruminants are 
raised primarily for dairy products and draught power.  Dairy animals require a greater 
                                                 
10 The ILRI Project on Multiple Use Crops could diminish the trade off between food crops and fodder crops. 
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investment in cash (purchase) and need more feed, fodder, and time to reach 
productivity.  In return, they offer a steady income that may be quite substantial.  
Dairy producers located in areas served by a cooperative system receive a regular 
payment for their milk throughout the year; producers may also sell to informal 
traders or private companies.  Because cooperative payments are based on milk fat 
ratios, buffalo milk is more profitable than cow milk.  The potential for profit appears 
to be greater for dairy than meat animals, although this is limited by difficulties in 
disposing of unproductive cows (See Section II).  Draught animals also require a 
substantial investment, and ownership may seem uneconomic for small holders who 
make use of the animals for only a small proportion of the year (See GOI-NLP 1996: 
4.3, Kurup 2003: Chapter 4).  However, access to draught power is critical during the 
tilling period.  In the absence of lease markets that serve small and marginal farmers 
at those times, many will choose to retain draught animals. 
Table 11: Market prices for livestock products in Orissa. 
 Local Market Price Notes 
Milk Rs. 6-10/litre  
Goats Rs. 700-900 Weight ~10-15 kg.  Body weight is 
not publicly assessed. 
Sheep Rs. 500-600 Weight ~10-15 kg. 
Pigs Rs. 1200-1500 Weight ~50 kg. 
Poultry R50-80/kg Most sales occur within the village 
Dung Rs. 80-100/cartload  
Source: Field study of livestock practices in Orissa (Mittal et al. 1999). 
The domestic market for meat is substantial; about 68 percent of Indians are not 
vegetarian (Mehta et al. 2002).  Tables 12 and 13 present information on Indian meat 
consumption.  For the most part, rearing meat animals requires less investment from 
producers.  The most common meat animals in the case study states were goats,11 
sheep, and poultry.  These small animals are less expensive to purchase and require 
less feed and fodder to gain sufficient weight to be profitably marketed.  The profit 
from meat animals depends in part on time of sale; meat animals are most profitable 
during the wedding and festival seasons.  
                                                 
11 Goat milk does not comprise a significant share of marketed milk in Andhra Pradesh or Orissa.  
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Table 12: Indian meat consumption: Market shares of various meats (Percent) (Mehta et al. 
2002). 
 
Year Beef Buffalo Mutton/Lamb Goat Pork Poultry 
1978 34 34 6 12 10 4 
1988 33 32 5 13 10 7 
1998 31 31 4 10 10 13 
2001 30 30 3 8 7 22 
Source: FAO Production Yearbook. 
Table 13: Percentage of households consuming meat, fish, and eggs 1993-1994 (Mehta et al. 
2002) 
State Rural Urban 
 Goat Poultry Fish Eggs Goat Poultry Fish Eggs 
Andhra Pradesh 22.4 18.4 25.9 52.3 20.3 19.4 20.6 57.2 
Orissa 14.2 9.1 58.6 12.2 41.3 6.2 63.7 34.2 
All India 20.3 7.5 30.7 22.0 28.0 9.0 27.1 34.9 
Source: National Sample Survey. 
Since the “poultry revolution,” organized intensive production has come to dominate 
markets for eggs and broilers.  Participation in intensive poultry requires a substantial 
investment in pedigreed birds, facilities, cages, and purchased feed.  Mehta et al 
(2002) describe a small farm as one with 3,000-10,000 birds.  This subsector is 
dominated by “gentleman farmers” as one informant described them.  However, many 
smallholders have continued to raise backyard poultry for profit.  The persistence of 
backyard poultry may reflect the spatial concentration of intensive poultry.  Intensive 
poultry producers have focused on the urban market, and many of these producers are 
located in peri-urban areas where transport is easier.  Over time, however, intensive 
producers may capture rural markets as well.  Because the potential of backyard 
poultry appeared to be limited by the intensive poultry sector, this sub-sector did not 
receive close examination.12 
Observers often describe the Indian livestock production system as low input, low 
output, but nevertheless it could be argued that this system is highly efficient.  Most 
producers expend little cash on food for their animals.  Instead of stall feeding or 
raising fodder-specific crops, producers let their animals forage for fodder in 
harvested fields, village pastures, local forests, and along roadsides, either with a 
herder or on their own.13  This system is perceived as low output by conventional 
measures14 such as litres of milk produced, animal weight at sale, and one would 
expect livestock to be more productive when provided with a better diet.  Ahuja, 
Morrenhoff and Sen’s 2002 study of livestock-owning households in Orissa provides 
suggestive evidence.  They report that average annual milk production for in-milk 
                                                 
12 Some argue that backyard poultry may be able to survive competition with intensively produced broilers.  At 
present, it seems, backyard poultry command a price premium for their superior taste.  Backyard poultry 
producers are unlikely to compete successfully with intensively produced layers because fertilized eggs do not 
travel well.  
13 There is, of course, substantial regional variation in livestock rearing practices.  Use of stall feeding and 
purchased feed is more common in places where cooperative dairy is very successful.  
14 These indicators may exclude other factors important to small producers. 
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crossbred cows was 850 litres for the poorest 20 percent of households and 1219 litres 
for the top 20 percent.15  It is due to the fact that the richer households provide their 
animals with superior inputs.  Extension may improve producers’ awareness of animal 
needs, but it is not clear that small producers have sufficient resources to garner 
these inputs.16  
The section that follows focuses on the politics and institutional structure of the 
livestock sector—including dairy, meat, and health services.  The dairy and meat 
subsectors are the only ones in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa that have both substantial 
participation by poor rural producers and high potential for benefit.  The return from 
all types of livestock is constrained by lack of access to animal health and breeding 
services, by the structure of the market, and by the inputs (feed and fodder) received 
by livestock.  Discussion of inputs—which are most affected by policies and 
organizations not focused on livestock—begins in Section III.  
                                                 
15 It should be noted that Orissa has the lowest bovine milk productivity in India.  The authors were interested 
in demand for livestock services and thus restricted their sample to households that own livestock; an asset 
index was used to determine household wealth.  Crossbred cattle comprised a smaller share of cattle stock in 
the poorest households (about 6 percent) than in the richest households (close to 10 percent). 
16 Whether small producers could provide better inputs would depend on factors such as the size of investment 
required, the cost/benefit ratio, and access to credit.  Productivity might also increase if producers were to 
shift breeds.  This issue is discussed further in subsequent sections. 
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SECTION II: SECTORAL OVERVIEW 
Livestock policy has rarely been a high priority for ambitious politicians and 
bureaucrats in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa.  Livestock comprises a small share of GDP 
and a small percentage of state investment (0.4-1.0%).  Although livestock producers 
comprise a substantial share of the population, they are not an important, organized 
political interest group.  Strategic political entrepreneurs are more likely to use 
identity (as Hindu, Muslim, dalit, adivasi) or their primary livelihood (agriculture) as a 
catalyst for mobilizing producers.  There is little reason to believe that producers’ 
votes for state and national candidates are based on their livestock policy platforms.  
Although there is greater scope for self-organization and advocacy on behalf of 
producers (see Section IV), it is unlikely that the sector will garner the attention 
devoted to telecommunications, energy, or caste reservation policies. 
Despite the low political profile of livestock, India’s political economy has an immense 
impact on the sector.  Caste hierarchies and religious divisions shape the options 
policymakers consider, the priorities of bureaucrats and service providers, and the 
strategies producers adopt.  Since Independence, formal Indian livestock policy largely 
has been driven by dairy—and thus by cows and buffalos.  The Anand model, extended 
through Operations Flood I, II, and III, and breeding interventions have attracted the 
attention of researchers, policy makers, and donors.  Yet the political economy of 
Indian livestock should not be reduced to large ruminants.  Cow and dairy politics are 
an important part of the sector—and are discussed in the following section—but so are 
goat politics, vaccination politics, and trade and liberalization politics.  This sectoral 
overview begins with a brief discussion of ‘cow’ politics.  It then shifts to major 
sector-specific interventions and the organizational structure that has resulted.  
Discussion of policies in related sectors—such as fodder and grazing—is reserved for 
Section III.  
‘Cow’ politics 
Although the Indian state is secular, there have been organized constituencies seeking 
a Hindu rashtra (state) since shortly after Independence (Graham 1990; Jaffrelot 
1996).  The Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) has been associated 
with the Jana Sangh family of parties, of which the governing Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) is a descendent.  The right of centre BJP has led the national government for 
most of the period since 1996.  It is closely allied with nationalist groups and has 
astutely used Hindu nationalist rhetoric to attract followers, allying with regional 
parties in areas where the appeal of Hindutva (Hinduness) is limited (Kohli 1998; Pai 
1998; Thakur 1998).17  Although the BJP has moderated its nationalist rhetoric 
somewhat since the early 1990s, Hindutva remains a central part of the party’s 
identity.  It is thus understandable that politicians and bureaucrats have been 
reluctant to adopt policies that conflict with popular understandings of Hinduism.18  
Most relevant to livestock policy are the special symbolic accord granted to cows and 
the association of vegetarianism with high caste (purity) and meat consumption with 
low caste.19  Cow slaughter is seen to be contrary to Hindu religious dictates, and 
                                                 
17 The Bharatiya Janata Party is the largest party within the ruling National Democratic Alliance. The BJP’s 
strongest political support comes from the “Hindi heartland” of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh and 
its outskirts—Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan. The BJP garnered 25.6 percent of all votes in the 1998 
elections but controlled 40.6 percent of the vote with its allies, enough to form a government.  
18 This discussion draws from Robbins (1999) and field observations and interviews.  
“Popular” may be a misleading term; there is little empirical work on perceptions of meat consumption.  
Scriptural and historical analyses indicate that the relationship between Hinduism and meat consumption is 
more complex than Hindu nationalists suggest (see cites in Noronha 1994; Robbins 1999).   
19 Kala (1994) estimated that 30 percent of Indian Hindus were nonvegetarian (cited in Robins 1999). Experts 
expect meat consumption to rise over time. 
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some Hindus regard beef consumption as sacrilegious.  Open cow slaughter is rare in 
most parts of India.20  It seems that social pressure has been sufficient to prevent non-
Hindus (such as Muslims, Christians) from openly engaging in this practice. 
Despite its rarity, cow slaughter has served as a symbolic issue for Hindu nationalists.  
The Constitution directs the State to take steps to prohibit cow slaughter (Art. 48).  
Nationalist groups have sought enactment of cow slaughter bans in each state and by 
the central government for several decades (see Robbins 1999).  Cow slaughter is 
illegal in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa.  State laws tend to be more severe in northern 
and western states (GOI-NLP 1996).  News reports indicate that a national ban on cow 
slaughter is under consideration by the BJP. 
There is little prospect for a near term shift away from anti-cow slaughter policies.  
There is no organized constituency for cow slaughter and little incentive for creating 
one because laxity in enforcement of cow slaughter bans allows those who desire to 
consume beef to do so discretely.  Those who wish to slaughter beef openly in 
northern India must weigh the costs of the communal violence it could catalyze.  
Hindu-Muslim conflict has led to hundreds of deaths in the last decade.  Non-Hindus 
do not seem to view this issue as worth the controversy.21  Non-vegetarians can openly 
purchase poultry, chevron (goat), mutton, lamb, pork, and buffalo, and consume beef 
discretely. 
Social and legal barriers to cow slaughter have important consequences for the 
livestock sector.  First, the ban poses a serious barrier to breed improvement and 
population control.22  Breed improvement generally involves selection for superior 
animals—those who perform best in the areas of concern (e.g., milk production, 
draught power).  Animals whose performance is inferior are usually culled or 
prevented from reproducing.  Slaughter bans remove the option of culling,23 and 
castration does not appear to be widespread.24  Instead, unproductive animals often 
are abandoned by their owners and left to wander.  These animals consume scarce 
fodder and may continue to reproduce.  Illegal slaughter produces low-quality beef for 
local consumption.  Other animals are smuggled along the informal trade routes to 
neighbouring countries (Bangladesh), ports (Kolkatta, Mumbai) or states where 
slaughter is legal (Tamil Nadu and Kerala); this however does not seem to be highly 
profitable for producers.  
Second, barriers to cow slaughter reduce the incentive for raising cattle (Noronha 
1994; Robbins 1999).  Because use is limited to dairy and draught power—and it is 
difficult to dispose of useless animals—investment in cattle may be less profitable 
than in other animals such as buffaloes.25  The sanctions against cow slaughter have 
been sufficient to prevent the production of cattle and buffalo for meat in India (GOI-
NLP 1996); most bovine meat is residual and of low quality. 
Third, the social stigma attached to slaughter imposes substantial humanitarian costs 
on some communities.  Dalits have traditionally been held responsible for disposal of 
dead cattle; this task provides one rationale for untouchability.  Because this task is 
                                                 
20 Cow slaughter and beef consumption are legal in Kerala, which has a substantial Christian population.  
Slaughter is legal in Tamil Nadu. Southern and eastern slaughter laws often permit some slaughter of 
unproductive animals (GOI-NLP 1996). 
21 Noronha comments “to the BJP’s dismay the passing of the recent cattle protection bill [in Delhi] did not 
raise even a semblance of protest from the Muslims.” (1994: 1448) 
22 Most of the interviewees with a concern for breed improvement raised this issue without prompting.  
23 The National Livestock Sector Policy Review notes that liberal slaughter laws permit slaughter of the 
unproductive.  In practice, this has meant “the old and the infirm, sterile or infertile female, and … 
malnourished” (Section 4.2.2).  Young cattle whose performance is substandard are unlikely to fit these 
criteria.  
24 A few informants suggested that humane castration could be consistent with Hinduism.   
25 Whether this is true in practice would depend on local conditions such as available fodder, the productivity 
of cattle, and the market for dairy as compared to meat.   
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socially stigmatized, however, neither veterinarians nor human health professionals 
have devoted attention to addressing the health risks posed by this trade.  The 
recurrent outbreaks of anthrax among dalits in Orissa are evidence of their continued 
marginalization.26  
Cow slaughter politics set the context in which state livestock sector policies 
developed.  The section that follows discusses the most important state interventions 
and analyzes their impact on livestock production, processing, and marketing.  These 
interventions have focused on the market for dairy and animal health and breeding 
services.  There has been very limited government investment in extension; efforts to 
increase producers’ awareness and skills have been extremely limited.  All of these 
sectors influence the welfare of poor rural livestock producers. 
State involvement in cooperative dairy 
The most important state and central government interventions in the livestock sector 
involve the market for milk.  The Anand (Gujarat) experience provided the basis for 
state policies, and thus this section begins with a brief summary of the Anand story.27  
Dairy cooperative societies in Gujarat first developed from the bottom-up.  Local 
producers in Anand organized themselves to resist exploitation from a British trader. 
With assistance from an astute engineer—Verghese Kurien—farmers gradually 
developed a cooperative model that enabled rural producers to supply urban milk 
markets (initially Bombay now Mumbai) without reliance on traders.  Over time, the 
Anand model came to comprise a three-tiered structure of village dairy societies, 
district unions, and a state milk marketing cooperative federation; a national 
federation was later created.  Each cooperative member had one vote in society 
decisions; all producers (from those with one cow or buffalo to those with 5 or 6) were 
at least formally equal. 
The cooperative approach allowed rural producers to capture a greater share of the 
profits from milk sales;28 this was the primary incentive for producers to join. 
Additionally, the cooperatives sought to provide a consistent outlet for surplus milk at 
stable prices, both during the dry season—when supply is low and prices high—and 
during the flush season—when supply is ample and prices lower—by processing excess 
milk into products such as powdered milk and curds (yogurt).  In return for this 
consistent buyer, however, producers had to subject their milk to regular testing.  
Cooperative payments for milk were and are based on fat content; milk is tested each 
and every time a producer supplies milk.  Private milk traders did not test the milk 
they collected, and thus producers (and traders) had greater opportunity to water 
milk. 
Anand became the model for Operations Flood I and II, III, (1970-1996), in which 
Anand Milk Union Limited (Amul), the government of India, the World Bank, and 
international donors sought to replicate the Anand model across India.  The National 
Dairy Development Board (NDDB) and the Indian Dairy Corporation (IDC) were created 
to shepherd this expansion; the IDC has been merged into NDDB.  Each Operation 
Flood phase targeted a set of states; a subset of districts then was selected for dairy 
development.  Andhra Pradesh was included in all phases of Operation Flood, and 
Orissa entered the programme in phase II (1981).  
                                                 
26 There were several TV and news stories on this issue in June and early July 2003.  It appears that medical 
practitioners were slow to intervene—there were several fatalities—and do not track disease outbreaks. 
27 There is substantial disagreement over the key factors driving Anand and the Operation Floods that followed. 
See the following references (Alderman, Mergos, and Slade 1987; Candler and Kumar 1998; Doornbos et al. 
1990). 
28 All milk does not enter the market; a substantial proportion of milk is consumed within the household where 
it was produced.   
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The Operation Flood (OF) expansion effort differed from the Anand experience in two 
ways that help to account for the generally inferior performance of the resulting 
cooperatives.29  First, the new cooperatives developed in a highly protected market 
and received substantial subsidies.  The formal dairy sector was reserved for 
cooperatives until 1991.  New private sector actors (foreign and domestic) were 
required to obtain licenses to enter the sector; few were granted.30  All dairy food aid 
was canalized through the Indian Dairy Corporation;31 and revenues from sales were 
directed to the cooperative infrastructure.  Societies, unions, and federations in 
Operation Flood areas received substantial financial, technical, and material 
assistance.32  Substantial resources were invested in creating a system that was safe 
and hygienic.  Unlike the Anand cooperative, therefore, OF dairy cooperatives did not 
face open competition nor hard profit incentives from the outset.33 
Secondly, the Operation Flood cooperatives were subject to extensive government 
involvement.  From the beginning, Operation Flood leaders opted for a top-down 
approach to replication.  In the absence of sufficient Anand-like societies in the 
targeted areas, national leaders resorted to working through state governments, 
wrongly anticipating that these governments would withdraw after the infrastructure 
was established.  State governments were heavily involved in creation, development, 
and management of the cooperative infrastructure.  Government involvement may 
have been necessary at the beginning, but most observers argue that continued 
political involvement in cooperative management has impeded their functioning.  In 
Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, as in most other states, state officials appoint the 
managing director of the state federation; informants indicated that district and 
village cooperative posts were sometimes appointed or politicized as well.  This 
practice creates problems of skill—the appointed managing director is often a member 
of the Indian Administrative Service, a generalist without experience in running a 
dairy business—and accountability—the managing director is accountable to the state 
rather than the dairy farmers.  In effect, cooperative positions have become a vehicle 
for political patronage.  As a consequence, some village societies are inactive and 
many district unions and state federations operate at a loss.  One report estimated 
that 70 percent of district milk unions were operating at a loss in 1998 (Government of 
India. Planning Commission 2002).  In the past 5 years, Orissa dairy cooperatives have 
sometimes resorted to milk holidays; the current state federation managing director, 
Mr. Hrushikesh Panda has prohibited the practice.34  Milk holidays directly affect 
producers’ income and provide a strong indicator of poor performance.35  These 
problems make dairy farming less profitable for producers, but have little impact on 
government-appointed directors.  In the past, cooperatives have secured state subsidy 
to cover their losses. 
These failings help explain why the formal sector continues to comprise only a small 
share of the total milk market.  Researchers estimate that 88 percent of marketed 
milk is sold on the informal market, often through traders (Sharma and Sharma 2002).  
Cooperatives comprise the overwhelming majority of milk marketed in the formal 
                                                 
29 Of course, there is wide variation in performance.  Some Operation Flood societies have performed 
reasonably well. 
30 There are some private dairy companies (e.g. Nestle) that have long had a presence in India. 
31 Dairy food aid is highly controversial.  Canalizing food aid avoided price shocks due to dumping, but it may 
have allowed a greater amount of foreign dairy products to enter India. (Doornbos et al. 1990). 
32 Since the end of Operation Flood III in 1996, the Government of India and the European Union have continued 
to provide financial assistance to dairy cooperatives through NDDB, but the magnitude of assistance is smaller.   
33 The original Kaira district cooperative eventually was able to obtain some support and preferential 
treatment from the Government of Bombay (Alderman, Mergos, and Slade 1987). 
34 A milk holiday is a day on which cooperatives will not collect milk. 
35 Well-run cooperatives should have sufficient capacity to chill and process all the fresh milk they receive.  
This milk may be marketed fresh or made into a variety of milk products.  AMUL products include ice cream, 
pizza, and processed cheese; Amul has 27 percent of the Indian ice cream market (Sharma and Sharma 2002). 
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sector; in 1995, the private sector accounted for only 13 percent of total fluid milk 
volume.  The formal sector procures roughly 19 percent of total milk in Andhra 
Pradesh (Government of Andhra Pradesh).  The Orissa State Cooperative Milk 
Producers’ Federation (OMFED) has a strong presence in 14 of the 31 districts 
(Pradhan, Ahuja, and Venkatramaiah 2003).36  In those areas, it procures 15-17 
percent of total milk.  Most other districts rely on collection by the Fisheries and 
Animal Husbandry Department;37 OMFED is seeking to increase its presence throughout 
the state.  In total, Orissa’s formal sector accounts for less than 10 percent of total 
milk or 20 percent of marketed milk.38  Cooperative dominance over the formal dairy 
market is thus less impressive than it seems. 
The dairy sector is highly organized at the national, state, and local level.  At the 
national level, the National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) and the Gujarat 
Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation (GCMMF) are most influential.39  NDDB, led by 
Dr. Amrita Patel, has substantial assets, expertise, and connections to national 
policymakers as well as dairy cooperatives.  GCMMF’s influence stems from its position 
as originator of the Anand model, its continued success, and the involvement of Dr. 
Kurien,40 a leader in the cooperative movement.  Both organizations are linked to 
government, but they have substantial autonomy.  The state dairy federations and 
district unions are closely tied to government, as described above, and enjoy much 
less independence.  It cannot be assumed that most dairy cooperatives represent the 
interests of their members. 
State service provision: Animal health and breeding 
For most of the post-Independence period, provision of veterinary and breeding 
services was seen as a state responsibility.  Andhra Pradesh and Orissa invested 
considerable resources in developing the human and material infrastructure to provide 
free veterinary and breeding services. Veterinary services were provided through a 
system of veterinary hospitals, clinics, and centres staffed by veterinarians and 
paraveterinarians.41 Andhra Pradesh had 285 veterinary hospitals, 1,808 dispensaries, 
and 2,889 centres in March 1999; Orissa had 13 hospitals, 527 dispensaries, and 2,937 
centres (Government of India. Ministry of Agriculture. Department of Animal 
Husbandry & Dairying 2003).  Animal health services and medicines provided during 
operating hours were supposed to be free.   
Recent research has shown that this system of nominally free services is quite costly 
to producers (Ahuja et al. 2000; Ahuja, Morrenhof, and Sen 2002).  Producers pay 
government practitioners for animal care, absorb considerable transportation costs, 
and must purchase medicines as free supplies are inadequate or on sale.  Additionally, 
while the reach of government services is considerable, many producers may be too 
                                                 
36 17 districts are now incorporated into the OMFED structure.  Of functional societies in these districts, about 
87 percent reported a profit in April 2003 (personal communication with OMFED). 
37  Two Orissa districts that were not selected for Operation Flood—Ganjam and Gajpati—have received 
substantial assistance from the bilateral Indo-Swiss Natural Resource Management Program. The milk union is 
affiliated with OMFED. 
38  Pradhan, Ahuja, and Venkatramaiah (2003) state that the formal sector accounts for less than 10 percent of 
total milk in Orissa; half the milk is consumed by producer households. 
39 Other dairy sector organizations include the National Cooperative Dairy Federation and the Indian Dairy 
Association, which the IDA includes private companies. 
40 Dr. Kurien worked at the Anand cooperatives and led NDDB throughout Operation Floods I & II.  He has 
retired from leadership of NDDB. 
41 Paraveterinarians in state employ usually have received substantial training—1 year in Orissa—and some form 
of certification; the names for these paraveterinarians vary from state to state.  Most other paraveterinarians—
such as community animal health workers and Ghopal Mitras— have less training. 
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far from providers to have access to state-subsidized care.42  Orissa’s animal health 
infrastructure is heavily concentrated in the relatively wealthy coastal districts 
(Ahuja, Morrenhof, and Sen 2002).  Although there is roughly one veterinary centre 
per 45 square kilometres, the area covered by each centre ranged from 16 square 
kilometres in one coastal district to 125 square kilometres in 2 interior districts. 
Similar regional disparities may be evident in other states.    
The central and state governments also developed a network of animal breeding 
facilities, including livestock breeding farms, frozen semen stations, liquid nitrogen 
plants, and semen banks. For example, Andhra Pradesh had 3,799 stationary artificial 
insemination centres, 4 frozen semen stations, 9 liquid nitrogen plants, 3 liquid 
nitrogen tankers, and 3 breeding farms for bulls (Andhra Pradesh Livestock 
Development Agency). These facilities were meant to provide the materials for 
genetic upgrading of local animals through frozen semen or bulls.    Genetic material 
for desired breeds was also purchased from other states and abroad.   
The effort to upgrade Indian livestock arises from the perceived low productivity of 
existing stock.  The milk yield of Indian bovines is extremely low by international 
standards.  The livestock population in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, as in much of the 
country, is mostly comprised of “nondescript” 43 animals that do not belong to a 
recognized breed, that produce a relatively small quantity of milk.  On average, 
Indian cows yield 877 kilograms of milk per year while the world average is 2,026 
(Sharma and Sharma 2002).   Exotic or cross-bred animals are believed to have higher 
production potential.  At present, the milk yield from crossbred cows exceeds that 
from local cows in each state.  However, most improvement efforts have met with 
little success.  The evidence shows that the proportion of crossbred cattle, buffalo, 
and sheep remains very low despite four decades of breeding initiatives. Although the 
recent population growth of crossbred milch cattle has outpaced that of desi milch 
cattle, crossbreeds comprise just more than 10 percent of milch cattle and about 6 
percent of all milch bovines in India (based on Ahuja et al 2000: Annexure Table 2.3); 
government crossbreeding efforts began in 1962 (GOI-NLP 1996). 
Three factors provide a sufficient explanation for the failure of these efforts.  First, 
breed improvement interventions have suffered from serious supply and quality 
problems.  The artificial insemination program encompasses only 15 percent of the 
breedable population (Ahuja et al. 2000); government and cooperative programs have 
not provided universal coverage.  Of those covered the National Livestock Policy 
Steering Group (1996) estimates that less than 20 percent of artificial inseminations 
result in conception.  The Andhra Pradesh Livestock Development Agency reports an 
artificial insemination conception rate of 38.5 percent; 27.9 percent of artificial 
inseminations produced live calves.  This quantity and quality of service is unlikely to 
change the livestock population.  
Second, the level of demand for crossbred animals is unclear.  The productivity of 
exotic and cross bred animals is more dependent on the inputs (feed, fodder, water, 
health services) received than that of desi (local) stock (Doornbos and Gertsch 2000).  
Because most Indian producers are not providing the necessary quantity and quality of 
inputs (see Mittal et al. 1999), the relative performance of crossbred and desi 
livestock given actual inputs is a crucial issue.44  Several informants indicated that the 
                                                 
42 Information on access to animal health services is limited.  Ahuja et al’s 2000 study found that more than 90 
percent of surveyed households in Kerala and Gujarat indicated they had access to health services while only 
63 did so in Rajasthan.  More than 95 percent of respondents from 5 districts in Orissa also reported access; 
however, the survey did not include the districts with the lowest density of veterinary centres (Ahuja, 
Morrenhof, and Sen 2002). 
43 It is not clear whether this appellation is accurate; it is likely that many “nondescript” animals are local 
breeds (Ramdas). 
44  Accurate assessment of the performance of desi and crossbred animals in India would require a great deal of 
data, including input data, producer characteristics, morbidity and mortality rates, time to productivity, 
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performance of crossbred animals was often inferior.  If it is the case that 
crossbreed’s actual or perceived performance is inferior, then poor producers would 
have little incentive to purchase or retain “improved” animals.  Demand for crossbred 
animals would then be low.  Informants linked poor performance to the inputs 
provided.  One informant stated that crossbred cows that failed to receive the proper 
diet often failed to go into oestrus.  Such animals provide no benefit to poor 
producers and may impose a loss.  For that reason, the informant argued that artificial 
insemination was inappropriate for people with insufficient resources to care for 
themselves; such people should not be asked to divert scarce resources to animals.  It 
follows that breeding programs focused on high-input animals are likely to have a 
regressive impact, imposing costs on the poor and providing benefits to those with 
resources.  Some informants argued that credit programs that required producers to 
purchase “improved” animals have left the poor indebted.  However, breeding 
programs linked with interventions that increase producers’ ability to provide inputs 
could have equitable or progressive (pro-poor) effects.   
Third, as mentioned, cow slaughter politics constrain breed improvement.  Some 
experts believe that cattle breed improvement initiatives—the major focus—are 
unlikely to succeed when producers cannot easily cull unproductive animals.  Because 
breeding initiatives have been more successful in Kerala, a state with good artificial 
insemination coverage (Ahuja et al. 2000) and the fewest barriers to slaughter and 
beef consumption, they argue that the anti-slaughter policies are the problem.  
However, Kerala differs from Andhra Pradesh and Orissa in many other ways as well.  
Without further analysis, it should not be inferred that slaughter policy change would 
be sufficient to produce the desired changes in the livestock population.  In any case, 
change in slaughter policy is not politically feasible. 
State involvement in provision of veterinary services and breeding has created a 
sizeable infrastructure.  The 1996 Livestock Sector Review estimated that about 
22,500 veterinarians and 45,000 paraveterinarians were in state or Union Territory 
government employ in 1989.  About 90 percent of veterinary graduates worked for the 
government.  The structure of animal husbandry departments is much like that of 
other Indian government agencies.  A political appointee—Minister of State Droupadi 
Murmu in Orissa—oversees the animal husbandry portfolio.  Animal husbandry is not a 
high profile area and thus ambitious politicians would not seek this post.  One 
informant indicated that animal husbandry sometimes has been used as a punishment 
post.  Ministers are attuned to the political implications of departmental activities but 
often have little interest in managerial and policy details. 
The top animal husbandry departmental civil servant, the Secretary, is usually an 
Indian Administrative Services (IAS) or State Administrative Service officer who reports 
to the Chief Secretary.  The Administrative Services are a lasting legacy of British 
colonial rule.  Individuals enter the Services at the beginning of their career through 
an extremely competitive process.  Officers remain with the IAS throughout their 
public career, but are posted to different positions as needed.  Transfers between 
departments and parastatal posts occur fairly frequently.  IAS officers are generalists 
who preside over a staff overwhelmingly comprised of technically expert veterinarians 
and paraveterinarians.  These civil servants are promoted from within the 
department.  Appointments to the highest posts (e.g. Director, Joint Director) often 
occur at the end of one’s career and thus tenure tends to be short—often less than 2 
years and sometimes as little as two months.  Most technical staff begin their careers 
as field veterinarians or inspectors, circulating among posts before moving, in some 
cases, to non-service work in the department.  Promotion for veterinarians and 
paraveterinarians is largely dependent on seniority; paraveterinarians have very little 
career mobility.  For both, there is often a long period in between promotions and the 
salary hikes that follow.  However, ambitious providers may seek more desirable, 
                                                                                                                                                        
productivity level, and duration of productive period.  Figures based on the population of animals in milk, such 
as Ahuja, Morrenhoff and Sen (2002), do not provide a means for comparing the full populations. 
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prestigious, and profitable posts.  One would expect greater competition for posts in 
the wealthier coastal regions than in the remote forests.  The coastal areas have a 
greater concentration of veterinary and paraveterinary posts.  It is possible that an 
informal market for posts allows purchase of some positions (Wade 1985).   
Government efforts to provide free animal husbandry and breeding services has 
benefited the veterinarians and paraveterinarians in its employ.  State employ has 
offered reasonable salaries, security, some infrastructure, and substantial opportunity 
for private gain through charges for services.  Oversight and accountability to 
producers has been quite limited.  Any alteration in conditions of service that 
increases expectations and accountability or diminishes security would encounter 
resistance from those with vested interests in this system. Because IAS officers are 
generalists whose careers advance (or retreat) through transfers among departments, 
Secretaries are less likely to have bested interests in the departmental status quo.  
This issue is discussed further in subsequent sections. 
Meat production 
The animals most frequently raised for meat in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa are poultry, 
goats, and sheep.  The state has engaged in much less sector-specific activity in the 
meat sector than in dairy.  On occasion, the central government has funded breeding 
projects or animal purchase.45  Central and state governments have passed laws 
regulating abattoirs,46 but these laws appear to be poorly enforced.  Meat animal 
producers thus operate in a mostly unstructured market environment. 
State neglect has produced divergent outcomes.  Small producers in Andhra Pradesh 
and Orissa have focused on the local markets with little involvement in the commodity 
chain linking the animals they rear to larger markets.47  The level of organization by or 
on behalf of these producers is limited, but Andhra Pradesh appears to be much more 
active than Orissa.  In Andhra Pradesh there are sheep and goat rearers’ associations 
with some presence at the village, district, and state level.  At least one of these 
associations has links to members of the state legislature, and thus some capacity to 
have its concerns raised.  Some rearers’ associations regularly engage in political 
protest, using direct action tactics—such as bringing their sheep to fill the offices of 
targeted officials—to garner attention and response.  The greater level of organization 
may have its source in sustained rural organizing by leftist and radical activists during 
the last several decades, the presence of NGOs willing and able to serve as 
institutional hosts (Houtzager 1998, 2001), and recent direct threats to these 
producers’ livelihoods (see following section).  The existence of multiple associations 
in Andhra Pradesh likely reflects ideological and social divisions among activists.  
However, informants indicated that these associations worked together on occasion.  
Orissa informants made no mention of sheep or goat rearers’ associations, and the 
facilitating factors above do not appear to be present in Orissa.  NGOs that work with 
poor livestock producers in Orissa appear to be less oriented toward political protest 
and mobilization.  Section IV discusses the potential for producer-based organizations 
further.  
The intensive poultry production sector—which comprises a substantial share of the 
market for eggs and broiler meat—is highly organized.  Producers have developed 
close linkages to those producing necessary inputs such as feed and vaccines.  These 
networks of affiliated organizations (such as National Egg Coordinating Council) 
                                                 
45 A sheep breeding farm was established during the Fourth Five Year Plan.  Animal purchase has been funded 
through welfare initiatives for women, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes. 
46 The Central Government had a project that provided financial assistance for improvement of slaughter 
houses and carcass utilization centres, but that project is being discontinued.  Andhra Pradesh received Rs. 63 
lakhs. 
47 There is some work on market linkages in Rajasthan (Agrawal 1999; Robbins 1999) 
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appear to be focused on market concerns, such as sharing egg price information.  The 
Government of India and the state governments did not play a major role in the 
“poultry revolution,” but state interventions may influence the subsequent 
development of commercial poultry.  Informants indicated that OPOLFED, the Orissa 
state poultry federation, was inactive.  It seems, there is little potential for pro-poor 
interventions in this area with the exception of animal health services.  Since 
mortality rates among backyard poultry are high, improvements in animal health 
services are likely to benefit poor producers.  (See Mehta et al (2002) for further 
discussion of intensive poultry.)  
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SECTION III: RECENT REFORMS 
This section begins with discussion of three broad changes in the policy environment—
liberalization, forest management, and decentralization.  Each shift has significant 
implications for the livestock sector in the near and medium-term.  The discussion 
then turns to sector-specific reform attempts at the national and state level.  These 
include the national livestock policy process, the Livestock Sector Policy in Orissa, and 
Vision 2020 in Andhra Pradesh  
Liberalization & the dairy market 
In 1991, the Indian government embarked upon a process of liberalization, which has 
involved trade policy reform, market reform, and privatization.48  The commitment to 
reform has been maintained through three governments—Congress Party (1991-96), 
United Front (1996-1998), and National Democratic Alliance (1998-).49  Liberalization 
has significant implications for the dairy industry—the only part of the livestock sector 
subject to substantial protection and regulation.  The Government of India signed the 
Uruguay Round Agreement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 
April 1994 and joined the World Trade Organization (WTO).  To comply with GATT and 
WTO, India has reduced its tariffs, removed restrictions on dairy imports, and ended 
the canalization of dairy imports through the National Dairy Development Board 
(NDDB).  The Government of India has continued to monitor imports of milk, milk 
products, and other livestock products.50  
The Government of India’s liberalization process included the opening of the formal 
dairy market to private (non-cooperative) actors.  The diary industry was formally 
delicensed in 1991.  In principle, delicensing has allowed private for profit companies 
to enter the dairy sector in large numbers, removing the effective cooperative 
monopoly over the formal sector.  In practice, liberalization was more limited.  After 
formal delicensing, the Government of India issued the Milk and Milk Products Order 
(MMPO) in 1992.  The MMPO raised barriers to entry by requiring that new entrants 
procure milk from new “milksheds.”51  This provision shielded the cooperatives from 
competition for milk supply, limiting producers’ alternatives.  Competition for the 
consumer milk market clearly increased, but in many cases, the new milkshed areas 
were less attractive or uneconomic.  Cooperatives continued to dominate the formal 
milk market.  The milkshed concept was eliminated with the amendment of the MMPO 
in 2001 and 2003; private companies may now purchase milk from areas where 
cooperatives are present.  These changes increase the potential for formal sector 
competition for producers’ milk. 
Although the registration and quality regulations in the MMPO were retained—all milk 
marketers are supposed to produce safe and clean milk products—enforcement 
appears weak.  The cooperative sector has invested substantial resources in creating a 
hygienic system, while informal traders have generally failed to address safety issues.  
In the past, ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ has served as a reasonable proxy for low and high 
quality milk, and consumers have been able to choose the quality which they prefer, 
paying a premium for formal sector milk.  Some informants (and Candler (1998)) argue 
that this system is breaking down.  They allege that many private dairies have relied 
upon purchase of milk from traders and have failed to create hygienic milk processing 
                                                 
48 The reasons for this reform are beyond the scope of this report (but see Pedersen 2000). 
49 The Bharatiya Janata Party is the largest party within this alliance. 
50 GATT and WTO also require reduction in agricultural and livestock subsidies.  Indian livestock sector 
subsidies are not substantial—in most areas there were none—and thus little change was required.  See Sharma 
and co-authors (2002a, 2002b, 2003) for extended discussion of dairy trade issues. 
51  The MMPO also required large-scale dairy operations to register.  All dairy operations are subject to product 
safety and hygiene regulations.  These have not been lifted. 
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systems.  These practices would enable dairies to charge less for their milk.  If such 
practices are widespread, and consumers continue to assume that formal sector milk 
is clean, then cooperative producers may become less competitive. 
As the state has opened the dairy sector to private actors, it has also adopted policy 
measures that may increase their ability to compete.  As was discussed, many diary 
cooperatives have been subject to substantial government control and intervention. 
Recent reforms in cooperative law have created space for cooperatives to restructure 
and increase their autonomy.  These laws include the national Amendment to the 
Companies Act (2003), the Mutually Aided Cooperative Societies Act of Andhra Pradesh 
(MACs, 1995), and the Orissa Self Help Cooperatives Act (2001); there are similar laws 
in at least seven other states.  For cooperatives registered under these new laws, 
government officials would have no role in decision making.  Instead, societies would 
be solely accountable to their members.  This would allow societies, unions, and 
federations to ‘hire and fire’ their management. 
Although cooperative advocates have succeeded in changing some laws,52 the struggle 
to reduce government involvement continues.  At present there are substantial 
barriers to re-registration for existing cooperatives.  Some states, such as Orissa, have 
been slow to implement the new laws.  In others, cooperatives must secure the 
consent of a government registrar to re-register.  Registrars enjoyed substantial 
influence over cooperatives under the old laws; securing consent is not always 
possible.  Additionally, dairy cooperatives frequently face disputes regarding 
ownership of existing infrastructure.  The state-controlled federation may seek to 
retain or claim restitution for property secured under its aegis (usually through central 
government or NDDB programs).  These issues have not been fully resolved in Andhra 
Pradesh, but 3,033 dairy societies had registered under the MACs law as of 31 March 
2003 (Cooperative Development Foundation, personal communication). 
This shift in cooperative law increases the potential for well-performing, 
professionally managed cooperatives to develop but does not guarantee this outcome.  
Cooperatives that choose to re-register face increased risk of failure; state 
governments are unlikely to subsidize autonomous cooperatives.  Many autonomous 
cooperatives would seek to hire people with technical expertise in dairy management 
and marketing; it is likely that other “autonomous” cooperatives would be captured 
by local elites or be consumed by local conflicts and thus would continue to perform 
below potential.53  In cases where societies are uneconomic or poorly managed, 
removal of subsidy may lead to closure.  It follows that a voluntaristic re-registration 
process may lead to creaming—the disproportionate exit of high potential 
cooperatives.54  Removing state involvement is costly and possibly conflictual.  Re-
registration would be most attractive to cooperatives that are relatively successful 
and confident of their ability to compete without subsidy.  Marginally successful 
societies and unions are more likely to remain within the state structure, and thus to 
lessen its sustainability. 
The most influential national dairy organizations do not agree on the appropriate 
response to the new environment.  NDDB has acknowledged that many cooperatives 
are not performing well and argues that improved marketing and reduced political 
interference is the best approach (Patel 2003).  NDDB has developed a joint venture 
                                                 
52 The Cooperative Development Foundation of Andhra Pradesh and the National Dairy Development Board have 
lobbied for changes in cooperative law.   
53 Some observers of the dairy sector argue that the dominance of the Patidar / Patel caste played an 
important role in the success of the Gujarat cooperatives (Alderman Mergos and Slade 1987; also see Doornbos 
and Gertsch 2000).  Other cooperatives may be riven by intercaste conflicts. 
54 One informant argued that the exit of successful dairy cooperatives from the state-controlled Andhra 
Pradesh federation has undermined the federation’s financial health. 
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model for providing federations with marketing expertise.55  The Matha Federation of 
Andhra Pradesh has become part of an NDDB joint venture.  Ultimately, these joint 
ventures are to be converted to “producer companies”, that is member-based 
cooperatives operating under the Company Law.  The other major player, Gujarat 
Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation argues that the joint venture approach is a 
threat to cooperatives: 
The key risk in the joint venture model is that it will dismantle the 
existing marketing federations all over the country.  If the joint venture 
fails, then there will be no organization or skill left in the farmers’ 
organizations to fall back on for the marketing function (GCMMF 2003). 
The chairs of NDDB and GCMMF are pressing state federations and district unions to 
take sides in this debate.  NDDB is seeking joint venture agreements and GCMMF is 
lobbying against them.  Several informants expressed concern regarding the effect of 
this argument on cooperatives.  “When elephants fight, the grass suffers.” 
Cooperatives maintained their dominance over the formal sector in the first decade of 
liberalization, but it is not clear how well they will compete in a fully open market 
that includes informal traders, private companies, and cooperatives from other 
states.56 Some dairy cooperatives, such as GCMMF (Gujarat) and Vishaka (of Andhra 
Pradesh), are clearly doing well; others seem less equipped to compete. 
Grazing on common & state property: New restrictions 
The majority of Indian livestock forage for fodder in post-harvest fields, common 
lands, and forests; purchased feed and dedicated fodder crops comprise only a small 
share of animal diets.  Historically, resource use often was constrained by local 
institutions—formal and informal rules governing how producers, farmers, and others 
used the commons; these institutions appear to have declined.  Even when local 
institutions control resource use, however, local organizations frequently lack formal 
ownership of the commons.  Many common lands and most of the forests are owned 
and controlled by state or national government.  The state has residual ownership 
over “wastelands” and village commons and has formal title to many forests.  Changes 
in conditions, management, and access policy affect many livestock producers.  
Conditions of common lands and forests have been declining for several decades, and 
policymakers have frequently blamed small ruminants for poor conditions.57  
Since the 1980s, forest ministries in particular have sought to reduce the presence of 
livestock in the forests.  The 1988 National Forest Policy sought to balance the needs 
of forest-dependent people and conservation.  It recommended fodder development 
projects and provision of forest produce—including fodder—“through conveniently 
located depots at reasonable prices.”  The policy also stated that the needs of tribals, 
scheduled castes, and other poor people were to be given consideration.  However, 
departmental assessments of carrying capacity rather than people’s needs would 
                                                 
55 An NDDB subsidiary would hold majority (51%) equity in the joint ventures, and thus could exercise control 
over the venture.  NDDB argues this is necessary to counteract political interference by state governments.  
56 Although dairy cooperatives have not begun to compete against each other for milk procurement, they are 
competing for market share.  Cooperatives are marketing milk outside their customary destination markets.  
Amul markets a wide range of products (ice cream, pizza) throughout India and internationally.  Andhra 
Pradesh cooperatives are marketing milk in Orissa.  
57 The Hanumantha Rao Commission (1987) evaluated the impact of sheep and goats on fragile ecological zones 
and concluded that small ruminants did not pose an ecological threat.  Many researchers argue that forest 
management policies, insufficient staffing, corruption, and local ingenuity are at least equally important.  
Historically, the forest department has found it difficult to monitor and control forest extraction (Agrawal and 
Ostrom 2001). 
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determine the area to which those living near the forest would receive access.  
Subsequent policies continued in this vein. 
The Forest Department of Andhra Pradesh has been particularly aggressive in its 
efforts to reduce forest extraction.  In 2001, the Department issued a notice of a draft 
policy that would dramatically reduce grazing in the forest.  One category of forests, 
“interior protection forests,” was to be entirely closed to grazing.  Other, “open 
forests”, were to be closed for four months each year.  The policy also restricted 
grazing to a certain number of “cow units,”58 granted villages adjacent to forests 
preference, and introduced grazing fees for the first time since 1968.  Goats were to 
be allowed into the forest only in the company of sheep, with a maximum of 4 per 
group of 100 or more sheep. 
The proposed policy would clearly have had adverse impacts on poor livestock 
producers—the department estimated that 50 percent of cattle frequent the forest 
and acknowledged that most goats and sheep graze on common land.  The sheep and 
goat rearers’ associations and their NGO allies quickly mobilized in response.59  
Anthra, an Indian NGO, coordinated the response to the draft policy.  Started by 
women veterinary scientists in the 1990s, Anthra works with poor people in rural areas 
on livestock issues.60  Anthra has established networks of livestock rearers, animal 
health workers, and traditional healers; it also works closely with other NGOs on rural 
issues, women, and adivasis.  The proposed policy was discussed at a forum on fodder 
and grazing issues.  The participants were livestock rearers, NGO staff, and 
representatives of people’s organizations; senior government officials were invited but 
did not attend.  Subsequently, sheep and goat rearers convened at a state-wide 
meeting, discussions were held in several districts, and a critique of the logic behind 
the policy—particularly the focus on goats—was issued (Fodder and Grazing Forum 
n.d.).  Individuals also used connections with elected officials and civil servants to 
ensure that the issue was raised; official correspondence between the Principal 
Secretaries of Animal Husbandry and Forestry then ensued.  This mobilization led to 
the withdrawal of the policy and the formation of a committee to examine the issue.  
Committee membership was initially comprised solely of senior government officials 
from each department and Dr. Sagari Ramdas (director of Anthra) as a representative 
of the Grazing and Fodder Forum of Andhra Pradesh; later it was revised to include 
representatives from the sheep and goat rearer and adivasi communities.  The current 
Forest Department grazing policy is “to have no policy.”  While this incident 
demonstrates the ability of Andhra Pradesh livestock producers and their advocates to 
organize in defence of their interests, it also shows their vulnerability and relative 
marginality—it is unlikely the Forest Department would have issued a policy ending 
commercial timber extraction without prior notice and consultation with the industry.  
The new committee may serve as a means for producers to engage pro-actively with 
the Forest and Animal Husbandry departments.  This issue is discussed further in 
Section IV. 
New management strategies: Decentralization & user groups 
The third broad shift in the policy environment is decentralization.  Two recent 
constitutional amendments have provided local governments—the Panchayati Raj 
                                                 
58 Anthra argues that the cow unit equivalences have little scientific validity for they do not reflect established 
standards regarding the relative impact of different livestock-cows, buffaloes, goats, and sheep.   
59 This discussion is based on Anthra (2002) and the author’s interviews with participants and observers of this 
process. 
60 Anthra, an NGO based in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, describes itself as “an alternative resource 
training and advocacy centre for bio-diversity based livestock production in the wider context of people’s 
livelihoods” (Organizational brochure).  The organization trained about 300 animal health workers between 
1994 and 2002.  Anthra receives support from international donors and also raises funds by charging for 
workshops, trainings, and consultations provided to other organizations. 
Section III: Recent reforms 
26 
institutions (PRIs)—with substantial formal authority over policy, including natural 
resource management.  To date, the PRIs have not garnered sufficient control over 
financial resources in Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, or most other states to have substantial 
authority.  If the PRIs manage to secure actual control over constitutionally allocated 
powers, however, these institutions will control access to common lands, water, and 
forests.  As with the forest policies above, PRI access policies will affect livestock 
producers’ livelihoods. 
The actual impact of decentralization, should it occur, is unclear.  Some believe that 
PRIs have the potential to increase local democracy and accountability—most positions 
are elected and places are reserved for traditionally underrepresented groups such as 
women, dalits and adivasis.  Others look to the Gram Sabha—the collective of all 
voters—for democratic, equitable decisions.  But others contend these institutions 
could provide a new mechanism for clientelism.  Individuals appointed to posts 
reserved for underrepresented groups may be accountable to their appointers rather 
than the group they ostensibly represent.  All local organizations are vulnerable to 
elite capture.  Capture of the Panchayati Raj institutions would become more 
desirable if they garner control over important resources.  In the absence of concerted 
efforts to create institutional safeguards for pro-poor PRIs, the effect of 
decentralization on poor livestock producers is likely to vary from place to place 
depending upon the social composition of the area and the degree to which producers 
organize on behalf of their interests. 
Although full decentralization to the Panchayati Raj institutions has not yet occurred, 
central and state government resource management strategies have shifted towards 
greater local involvement.  While renewing efforts to conserve the forests (as 
described above), Forest Department officials have sought to enlist communities in 
forest monitoring and protection through Joint Forest Management, now called 
Community Forest Management.61  This shift towards local user groups is evident in 
watersheds and irrigation management as well (Mosse 1997, 1998).  Local 
participation initiatives have generally involved the creation of user groups that are 
granted some authority over nearby areas and given limited rights to extract resources 
in exchange for monitoring and enforcement of access rules.  In some places, these 
local user groups have provided monitoring and enforcement where there was little 
before (Agrawal 2001).  The extent of local control of user groups is unclear.  Officials 
enjoy substantial discretion in determining which areas are suitable to community 
management and in approving access rules, but some user groups may have 
substantial authority. 
Improvements in forest condition from lessened resource extraction potentially have 
broad benefits, and motivated user groups—or policy makers—probably could design 
equitable policies.  However, researchers have found that many of the costs have 
been imposed on the poorer segments of communities—including livestock producers—
while local elites have captured the benefits (eg, Ramdas n.d.).62  Agrawal (2001) 
argues, “Allocation rules, even when they are seemingly equitable, produce outcomes 
that are systematically biased against those who are marginal and less powerful.”  
Restrictive livestock access rules, for example, hurt the poor disproportionately, for 
they are most dependent on common areas and least able to pay fines or bribes. If 
officials and user groups continue to restrict livestock grazing without compensation, 
the ability of poor producers to maintain their livestock will decline.  In some cases, 
Forestry officials have encouraged producers to sell their goats (Rao 2001). Research 
on community watershed management indicates that these concerns are valid there as 
well (Kerr 2002). 
                                                 
61 See the following for extensive discussion of these initiatives (Poffenberger and McGean 1996; Khare et al. 
2000; Sundar 2000). 
62 Although less research is available on these committees, many are comprised mostly of individuals who own 
land next to water.  
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In Andhra Pradesh, Chief Minister Naidu has used the Janmabhoomi Programme and 
user/self-help group to circumvent the Panchayati Raj institutions (Manor 2000; Powis 
2003).  The PRIs in Andhra Pradesh are highly politicized and party competition for the 
gram panchayats is the norm.63  Although Naidu’s Telegu Desam Party (TDP) is 
dominant, other parties have been able to secure representation in the gram 
panchayats and thus the TDP cannot fully control PRI activities.  The state government 
has not devolved substantial powers to the PRIs; the elected sarpanch continues to 
control most local government resources. As an alternative to the PRIs, Naidu has 
created the Janmabhoomi Programme and encouraged the creation of user groups for 
watershed management, forest management, irrigation and other areas.  
Janmabhoomi is a “people-centred participatory development process” through which 
villagers are supposed to express their needs through the Gram Sabha, identify 
solutions, and then mobilize to implement them.64 The Janmabhoomi—community 
mobilization—takes place about every three months.  Informants indicated that the 
“people-centred” Janmabhoomi is highly politicized and tightly controlled by local 
bureaucrats; there is little evidence that local communities are driving this process  
(Powis 2003).  Janmabhoomi may serve as a mechanism for service and resource 
delivery, but it has not empowered the local PRIs.  Some also contend that the many 
user groups in Andhra Pradesh have been politicized and serve as a vehicle for 
political patronage. 
National livestock sector policy process 
During the early 1990s, the Government of India undertook a comprehensive review of 
the livestock sector with the aim of developing a new policy framework; the 
Government of Switzerland collaborated in this project.65  A Steering Committee was 
established in 1993, and consultants drafted papers on a wide range of issues; the 
World Bank also commissioned studies on related topics.  These papers, a synthesis 
report, and perspective papers, were shared at two national workshops and revised in 
response to comments.  These workshops sought to engage all the relevant 
stakeholders66, but there appears to have been little organized participation by 
farmers or livestock producers.  Of the more than eighty participants listed, only two 
participants were listed as farmers.  The informants felt that governments, 
cooperatives, and service providers/NGOs were most influential.  Finally, the 1996 
National Livestock Policy Perspective Report proposed a new livestock policy 
framework.  Although leaders hoped that this process would lead to a national 
livestock policy, little visible progress towards a national policy has been made to 
date.67  The reasons for the failure of this national policy effort are unclear. 
The livestock policy process succeeded in influencing state and national policy 
debates; the perspective presented in the Report and some of the specific 
                                                 
63 The degree of party politicization of the PRIs in Andhra Pradesh may be exceptional (Powis 2003). 
64 Janmabhoomi was launched in 1997.  The core areas are community works, primary education, primary 
health and family welfare, environmental conservation, and responsive government. 
(http://www.aponline.gov.in/quicklinks/programmes/janmabhoomi/janmabhoomi.html).  Several 
Janmabhoomis have included “free” veterinary camps. Informants indicated that a substantial proportion of 
veterinary camp vaccines and medicines were sold.  
65 As is discussed elsewhere, the Swiss have been involved in the Indian livestock sector for more than 40 years.  
The Swiss Agency for International Development (SIDA), Intercooperation, and state-based bilateral agencies 
(Indo-Swiss projects) are the primary agents. 
66 Participants included state and national civil servants, NGO and INGO staff, consultants, researchers, dairy 
cooperative leaders, corporation leaders, industry association leaders and farmers (GOI-NLP). Informants 
indicated that environmentalists and animal rights/welfare interests were also represented.   
67 The Government of India has approved an Agriculture Policy, which makes brief mention of livestock.  The 
chapter on animal husbandry and dairying in the 10th Five Year Plan (2002-2007) is only the policy statement.  
(National livestock sector policy is subject to periodic review as part of the preparation process for each five-
year plan.) 
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recommendations have been adopted.  For example, the Report argued the existing 
breeding infrastructure was ineffective and inefficient.  It proposed the transfer of 
this infrastructure to state livestock development boards and service delivery to 
private practitioners.  The National Project on Cattle and Buffalo Breeding adopts this 
approach. 
Orissa livestock sector policy 
The Orissa livestock sector policy process was modelled after the national process and 
involved many of the same actors.68  The state established a steering committee in 
1998, the committee undertook a broad review of the livestock sector (Kurup 2003), 
using consultants to synthesize available research and collect original data when 
necessary, findings were presented to stakeholders in a series of workshops, and 
recommendations were drafted.  Throughout this process, staff at the Indo-Swiss 
Natural Resource Management Program-Orissa (ISNRMPO) worked closely with officials 
at the Department of Fisheries and Animal Resources Development (FARD), both line 
staff in the Directorate of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services and appointees 
such as the FARD Secretary and Joint Director.  After the Steering Committee 
completed its work, responsibility for navigating the policy adoption process shifted to 
FARD.  The department drafted a policy and took it through the internal consultative 
process69 and secured Cabinet approval.  After a hiatus partly due to the disastrous 
supercyclone of 1999, the policy was approved in October 2002, subject to occasional 
review by the Cabinet.  The consultation process included scientists, veterinarians, 
NGOs, and farmers.  Most Orissa informants reported some involvement in the policy 
process,70 although those who take issue with the market-focused approach adopted 
do not feel their concerns were addressed.  Observers and participants in this process 
credit ISNRMPO—“the only stable proponent of the policy”— and the current Secretary 
with securing its adoption.  Neither of these actors can be relied upon to shepherd the 
new policy through full implementation, for the Secretary is subject to transfer, and 
the bilateral Indo-Swiss Programme is dependent on the continued good will of 
government officials for its access.71 
The primary reforms adopted in the Orissa Livestock Sector Policy (OLSP) are the 
following: 1) the marketization72 of veterinary and artificial insemination, 2) capacity-
building of small holders,73 3) promotion of linkages between grassroots organizations 
and the animal husbandry department,74 4) re-orientation of the directorate towards 
                                                 
68 Dr. MPG Kurup served as a coordinating consultant for both processes, and the Swiss Government (Indo-Swiss 
Natural Resource Management Program-Orissa in this case) collaborated with state government.  
69 The draft was examined by the department, who sought expert opinion on some technical matters, 
circulated to other departments—approval of the Finance Department was critical—and then went to Cabinet.   
70 Most of the individuals interviewed were not livestock producers or farmers; it is not clear how well these 
perspectives were represented in the policy process. 
71 As with other Indian bilaterals, the Indo-Swiss Programme must secure consent from the Government of India 
for its programme of work.  If the current secretary were replaced by one hostile to their approach, ISNRMPO 
could lose its privileged access to state officials and civil servants.  To date, ISNRMPO has focused its 
implementation support efforts on two areas: development of departmental human resources and institutions 
and creation of linkages between the department and grassroots organizations.  
Additionally, the priorities of ISNRMPO could change.  Although the Swiss government has been involved in the 
Indian livestock sector for more than forty years (Intercooperation 2000), it recently has shifted towards a 
natural resources approach in which livestock comprises one part.   
72 Marketization is used to describe a general shift towards subjecting health services to market forces.  This 
may include full privatization, but also encompasses more limited reforms such as user fees.  
73 These initiatives were intended to increase productivity and reduce reliance on state services. The policy 
mentions veterinary first aid, vaccination, parasite control, feed supplementing, sheltering, innovations and 
candling (Section 3.1(b)).  
74 “These organizations can form the organic link between the department and the small holders as well as the 
conduit for transfer of technologies, skill training, extension support and even inputs.” (Section 3.1(c)). 
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disease control, prevention and eradication, and livestock sector development.  The 
policy states that there should be “greater autonomy, greater member control and 
reduced government interventions” in OMFED and its affiliates but provides no 
specifics on what this would entail.  The state would promote intermediate 
technologies—such as crossbred milch animals—through credit schemes and other 
programs.  The Policy also seeks to develop an ecologically sustainable livestock 
sector and identifies the bovine population as a threat (Section 3.6).  Consistent with 
its prior orientation, the OLSP is relatively expansive on breed improvement issues but 
provides less detail on other subsectors and issues. 
Two reforms have already been implemented.  The state has implemented user 
charges for veterinary and breeding services; in most cases these fees are quite low.  
As mentioned, most producers were already paying for services, and the fees provide 
the department with discretionary funds.  Orissa also has created a formally 
independent agency, the Orissa Livestock Resource Development Society (OLRDS), 
which will assume ownership of the breeding infrastructure.  Creation of the OLRDS 
made Orissa eligible for financial support from the National Project for Cattle and 
Buffalo Breeding; user charges are also being routed to OLRDS.  Operations and 
maintenance of the breeding farms was quite costly; shifting ownership relieves the 
fiscal burden on the state and may allow for closure of some facilities.  As of July 
2003, the state had not ceded authority over OLRDS; the transitional governing Task 
Force was comprised primarily of civil servants.75  
The OLSP views grassroots organizations as a potential link between the Department 
and small producers, and a means for capacity building and resource transfer.  There 
are many NGOs that work directly with communities; the policy thus seeks to link 
NGOs to state government.  Over the last decade, NGOs have taken the initiative in 
training community-based veterinary paraprofessionals.  In most cases, the programs 
were designed as follows: communities selected a few individuals to become 
community animal health workers; NGOs provided these individuals with training, a 
veterinarian kit, and subsidy; and then the individuals begin working in their home 
village, charging fees for their service.  Since the OLSP was adopted, the Indo-Swiss 
program has begun an initiative to link these NGOs with the Directorate of Animal 
Husbandry and Veterinary Services. 
To fully implement the OLSP, more radical change is required.  The state would have 
to withdraw from direct service provision in most areas, encourage community-based 
paraprofessional service providers, and radically increase its activity in two areas 
where it has had little presence before, extension and disease control.  The 
government faces considerable obstacles to full implementation of these changes for 
two reasons.  One, they conflict with the vested interests of most departmental 
employees, and two, the state lacks capacity in these new areas.  As discussed, the 
Directorate is comprised primarily of veterinarians and paraveterinarians who receive 
a salary and benefits, are paid by users for their services, and face few sanctions for 
poor performance.  “A veterinarian enters Government service at around the age of 
23-25 years, with an assured tenure of some 35 years in Government service until 
superannuation” (GOI-NLP: Section 7.8).  The changes envisioned in OLSP would 
require veterinarians and livestock inspectors to fully enter the market for health 
services (losing salary security), would increase the stature of community service 
providers, and would require that veterinarians face increased accountability for 
performance.  One would expect most veterinarians to resist these changes.  To date, 
retired veterinarians have been the most vocal critics of the new policy.  
Veterinarians’ ability to resist changes arises not from the constituency they serve—
which might benefit from change—but from the structure of the state bureaucracy.  
State employees have considerable security of tenure—Orissa cannot privatize 
                                                 
75 Of 11 members, 7 are state officials—including the OMFED Managing Director, 2 are affiliated with ISNRMPO, 
1 represents the state Veterinary College, and 1 represents NDDB.   
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veterinary practice without rewriting long-established civil service rules that affect 
most government employees.  To do so would require expending serious political 
capital and alienating most civil servants for limited rewards—it is unlikely that 
livestock producers would reward reforms with political loyalty.  One observer of 
national reform noted that this type of civil service reform is unprecedented in India; 
it is unlikely that the low profile livestock sector will lead in this area. 
To lessen the resistance from veterinarians, OLSP states that the changes in veterinary 
service will take place over a 25-year period.  Current employees will be allowed to 
become mobile practitioners in some areas but will not lose their benefits.  This 
strategy could provide a simpler way to transition to the desired new system, if the 
state managed to avoid hiring staff with the same rights.  To do so, it could leave 
vacancies unfilled—a common practice—or establish different contracts for new 
employees.  However, the long transition period poses substantial risks that reforms 
will simply grant formal recognition to the old system of state funded private 
practice.  While line staff and field staff will probably stay with the department until 
retirement, it is highly unlikely that the top department officials—secretary, 
commissioner, etc—will remain in their positions for 25 years.  If their replacements 
lack commitment to this reform vision, they may bring in new veterinarians under the 
old rules, halting the transition. 
The mismatch between present departmental capacity and the skills required by the 
new approach may be easier to address.  Currently, the training government 
practitioners receive emphasizes curative interventions and grants prestige to large 
ruminants.  Staff remaining in the state’s employ would be expected to work in 
extension and disease prevention.  These are areas their training did not emphasize 
and for which the potential for side benefits is limited—the market price for extension 
is likely to be low due to its semi-public good qualities.76  At the time this research 
was conducted, the incentive problem had not yet been addressed—promotions and 
raises were not linked to delivery of these services.  Other barriers to effective 
service provision include the low prestige granted to serving poor, socially marginal 
producers, and the lack of epidemiological skills required for disease surveillance and 
monitoring.  The state has begun to take steps to address the skill mismatch with 
assistance from ISNRMPO, who are supporting the Human and Institutional 
Development initiative.  The central government will support efforts to control foot 
and mouth disease. 
The Orissa Livestock Sector Policy explicitly seeks to help the poor.  It argues that 
livestock can serve as “an engine for the social and economic development of the 
rural population” and lists “capacitat[ing] the marginalized sections … so that they are 
enabled to have equal access to the opportunities offered” as a goal (Sections 2.1, 
2.4).  The rationale for reforms is clear. Government veterinary and breeding service 
provision has consumed most of the budget but has failed to provide free service, to 
reach most/all producers, or to accomplish breed improvement.  Additionally, state 
services and medicines have not been targeted to the poor (Ahuja, Morrenhof, and Sen 
2002). 
Whether the OLSP improves the welfare of poor livestock producers as promised 
depends upon the manner in which it is implemented.  The principal effects of the 
proposed reforms concern health and breeding services.  As has been discussed, the 
present system is not particularly pro-poor.  Livestock producers who reside fairly 
close to a veterinary clinic or hospital benefit from access to care; in some areas, 
                                                 
76 In economic theory, a pure public good exhibits nonexcludabiity and nonrivalry (one person’s use does not 
prevent another’s).  These traits create free rider problems—since those who bear the costs of provision cannot 
exclude others from benefit, there is little incentive to invest. For semi-public goods, exclusion is difficult 
and/or subtraction (crowding) effects occur.  Willingness to pay for these goods depends on how the exclusion 
and rivalry problems are addressed, as well as on the private benefits garnered by recipients of these goods.  
(These factors may vary according to the disease or extension service).  Obviously, the quality of services 
provided would also affect demand and market price. 
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NGO-trained paraveterinarians provide service.  Some dairy producers also benefit 
from local cooperative societies that provide alternatives to local sale or reliance on 
informal traders.  Both veterinary services and dairy cooperatives have a stronger 
presence in the relatively wealthy coastal belt as compared to the poorer inland areas 
and the forested areas in which most adivasis reside (Ahuja, Morrenhof, and Sen 
2002).  If the state were to increase provision of semi-public goods such as extension 
and disease control and eradication equitably, this would clearly be of benefit to 
small producers. 
The changes that would most directly affect poor producers involve the marketization 
of health services.  User charges have the potential to restrict access to care—if 
charges exceeded ability to pay—or they might increase access if charges were used to 
improve service, service providers became more mobile, and/or providers entered 
previously unserved areas.  The new user charges are low compared to the prices 
producers were paying previously.  If the charges have not lead to a change in market 
price, then the fees would have little negative impact on poor producers.  Further 
research into current market prices and ability to pay may be advisable.77  
Department officials indicated that fee revenue, currently held in ORLDS coffers, 
would be routed to service centres for improvement.  Local committees would have 
some say in allocation of this revenue.  These measures may improve service quality. 
The impact of privatization would depend on the resulting distribution of service 
providers and the characteristics of the local market for service.  State officials 
indicated that privatization would be implemented first in high potential districts 
where conditions were suitable—mostly those along the coasts—and gradually 
extended elsewhere; state service might continue indefinitely in places where private 
practice seems unsustainable.  Since the department has adopted a strategy of 
transition through attrition, however, it is not clear whether and how service will be 
targeted to the poorer areas.  At present, services are concentrated in the wealthier 
coastal areas.  Many of the poor and remote places are ill served; new posts might 
need to be established.  To target services to poorer areas, the department would 
need to develop appropriate incentives, for one would expect veterinarians and 
paraveterinarians to resist transfer to remote areas.  Community animal health 
workers may be willing to work in these areas, but veterinary codes require that they 
restrict their activities to minor veterinary services.  It is also unclear whether poor 
areas possess sufficient resources to pay workers enough to sustain themselves 
(Ramdas and Ghotge 2002).  Intervention to extend access to services in remote areas 
could have substantial pro-poor effects. 
A second consideration for marketization is the likely structure of markets.  Advocates 
of this model argue that fees and privatization will make providers more accountable 
to the producers who use this service.  However, users’ ability to hold providers 
accountable is limited by the level of local competition and their information 
regarding service quality.  If there are multiple providers, the market would allow 
providers to select the quality and cost they prefer.  When producers encounter a 
local monopoly or oligopoly, however, they encounter the difficult decision to pay 
more for inferior service or to go without—risking the loss of their animals.78  
Additionally, obtaining information on service quality may be costly—poor quality 
artificial insemination can result in the loss of a calving season—and may be flawed. 
                                                 
77 Research indicates that producers are willing to pay.  Ability of producers to pay clearly varies with their 
wealth.  To evaluate the impact of these charges, one would need answers to several questions.  What are the 
new market prices for veterinary and breeding services?  Have the user charges simply been added to 
veterinarian fees? Have they fully or partially displaced the informal charges?  In practice, is ability to pay 
taken into account? Are prices restricting access to services for poorer producers? Have charges increased 
practitioners accountability to livestock producers as was proposed.  Orissa DAH&VS officials indicated that 
they have commissioned research into the impact of user fees.  
78 Leonard (2000) proposes several strategies for addressing this problem. 
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If marketization is implemented without attention to ability to pay, targeting, and 
market structure and quality, anti-poor outcomes could result.  One might get well 
functioning, mobile, and competitive service provision in the wealthier coast while 
the poorest areas lose all access to professional service as the remaining veterinarians 
would also service the coastal areas. If the department and its partners are attentive 
to these issues, however, service might well improve for all producers.  The concerns 
raised above could be mitigated through careful design and implementation of a 
market-based animal health services model.  Given the low level of mobilization by 
Orissa’s livestock producers, however, other actors would need to advocate on their 
behalf.  This issue is discussed further in Section IV. 
Andhra Pradesh’s Vision 2020  
In early 1999, the government of Andhra Pradesh released Vision 2020, a broad vision 
and strategy document for the next 20 years.  Although several sectoral task forces 
and consultant groups were involved in its creation, Vision 2020 clearly draws its 
motive force from Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu.79  Vision 2020 sets the broad 
framework for state policy, establishing broad goals and concrete objectives, and 
identifying several sectors that will serve as “growth engines.”  These include dairy 
farming, poultry, and agro-industry.  The poultry and agro-industries sections focus 
solely on further development of the commercial sector. 
Although many of the initiatives outlined in Vision 2020 are similar to those in the 
National Livestock Policy Perspective and the OLSP, Vision 2020 departs from these 
policies in its emphasis on large-scale private sector involvement in the agriculture 
and livestock sectors.  For example, Vision 2020 strongly advocates the entry of large 
private investors to commercial farming.80  Vision 2020 argues that large private 
investment is essential to the development of these sectors and seeks to create an 
enabling environment for investment.  Several critics have taken issue with the Vision 
2020 approach (Prajateerpu: a citizen's jury/scenario workshop on food and farming 
futures for Andhra Pradesh, India 2001; ANTHRA; Reddy 1999); this analysis focuses 
more narrowly on policy proposals in the agriculture sector that would affect poor 
livestock producers. 
Vision 2020 outlines three major initiatives to attract private investment: 
infrastructure improvement, facilitation of economies of scale, removal of regulatory 
barriers and disincentives, and targeted research and development.  Infrastructure 
investment includes road, port, and airport construction—to connect major rural 
production centres to urban areas, for example—and improvements in rural power and 
water supply as well as provision of sector-specific facilities—such as cold storage.  
Improvements in rural infrastructure and market linkage are likely to benefit small 
livestock producers.  Better roads could improve goat and sheep producers’ access to 
urban consumers and reduce the transportation costs incurred by intermediaries, 
increasing the potential for profit.  Increased access could diminish the already 
limited market for backyard poultry if sale of intensive poultry increases in rural 
areas, but this seems a reasonable trade off.  More consistent power could lessen the 
costs that cooperatives and private actors incur for milk chilling and processing, and 
could make sanitary meat practices more feasible.  Ports and airports are less likely to 
directly affect poor producers as they sell mostly to local and state markets.  
Vision 2020 argues that the small size of agricultural holding inhibits the growth and 
development of the sector.  It thus advocates measures to consolidate holdings and 
increase output, including agricultural cooperatives, contract farming, and land 
                                                 
79 CM Naidu is seen as a dynamic leader and has been credited or blamed for the tenor of the state’s reform 
efforts. Andhra Pradesh is led by the Telegu Desam Party. 
80 The emphasis on large investors stems from the investment required for infrastructure, distribution and 
marketing. 
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consolidation.  Both land and livestock are distributed inequitably in Andhra Pradesh, 
but livestock holdings are less inequitable.  Neither cooperatives nor contract farming 
would necessarily disadvantage small livestock producers; both should allow producers 
to retain their land.81  Land consolidation may negatively affect small landholders—
who are usually small livestock producers as well.  Registration and consolidation 
processes often have a regressive impact because land is re-allocated towards social 
elites and large landholders, who are best situated to defend their interests in the 
process.  In its discussion of land issues, Vision 2020 makes no reference to the 
welfare of small holders; it thus seems unlikely that their interests would be 
protected in the consolidation process.  It should be noted that land consolidation 
faces serious political opposition; it is perhaps the least likely of the initiatives 
discussed to be implemented.  
Removal of the regulatory barriers to private sector investment in agriculture or 
agroindustry would affect small livestock producers to the extent that they increase 
competition for livestock products or for market share.82  These effects are most likely 
to be felt in the dairy sector and poultry sectors; Vision 2020 makes no proposals 
regarding the non-poultry meat market.  Regarding dairy, Vision 2020 recommends the 
amendment of the Milk and Milk Products Order (since lifted) to reduce licensing 
requirements and suggests the disallowal of procurement from existing milk sheds.  If 
corporations were to set up farms or develop new milk sheds, Vision 2020 argues, they 
would assist in the expansion of the formal dairy sector.  Vision 2020 also commits the 
government to implementation of the Mutually Aided Co-operative Societies Act 
(MACs) to remedy the politicization of cooperatives. 
The effect of large private entry or expansion into Andhra Pradesh’s dairy sector on 
small dairy producers will depend on the behaviour of these private actors.  Increased 
competition for milk in new or existing milk sheds is likely to benefit producers, who 
may receive a better price, at least as long as both cooperatives and privates remain 
in the procurement market.  It is possible that private companies might not compete 
for milk from small producers; instead they might target only larger producers for 
collection83 or create private farms to produce their own milk.  In that case, 
competition for market share would increase and outcomes will depend on the ability 
of cooperatives to compete and the size of the consumer market.  Implementation of 
the MACs law would make it more likely that at least some milk cooperatives would 
compete successfully. 
The targeted research and development initiatives described in Vision 2020 have the 
potential to reduce the competitiveness of small livestock producers.  Because these 
initiatives would focus on the commercial sector and strong areas, these actors would 
benefit from a subsidy smaller producers would not receive.  Research suggests that 
initiatives focused on large producers frequently fail to benefit small producers.  
Similarly, development would focus on “historically strong” areas.  For example, the 
dairy initiatives are to focus on coastal Andhra Pradesh, and selected parts of 
Rayalseema and Telengana; replication will be limited to areas with large pasture 
lands.  For the most part, these historically strong areas are relatively wealthy; poorer 
areas would not be the focus of state attention.  
Other sector-specific reforms outlined in Vision 2020 include the reduction of 
government interference in dairy cooperatives, selective privatization of animal 
health and breeding services, increased investment in public goods services, and a 
feed and fodder development program.  Vision 2020 argues that the animal husbandry 
                                                 
81 The impact of contract farming would depend on the specifics of the contract.  In Andhra Pradesh, it seems 
likely that contracting would focus on households with larger plots of arable land, and thus would have little 
direct impact on small producers (Also see Singh 2002). 
82 The primary exception is the MMPO. 
83 “Small” and “large” are relative figures; a large producer might have 4 cows.  Some interviewees suggested 
that this was the dominant private sector approach. 
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department should privatize those private good services while continuing84 and 
augmenting provision of public goods—disease eradication, extension, programmes for 
weaker sections.  Andhra Pradesh has already implemented user fees.  It also has 
created an Andhra Pradesh Livestock Development Agency for breeding services and 
trained paraprofessionals (“Ghopal Mitras”) to provide fee-based breeding services.  
As in Orissa, the Livestock Development Agency is operated by government officials.  
No detail is provided on the public goods and feed and fodder programmes.  The 
feasibility and implications of these types of sector-specific reforms have already been 
discussed with reference to Orissa. 
Andhra Pradesh’s Vision 2020 differs from the Orissa Livestock Sector Policy in its lack 
of an explicit stated commitment to protect poor livestock producers.  Thus, there is 
greater reason for concern that policy implementers will not consider poor producers 
in their decisions.  Although Andhra Pradesh livestock producers (and their allies) are 
more organized and politically engaged than those in Orissa, small producers are most 
likely to mobilize around issues that have a large and direct negative effect on their 
livelihoods—such as grazing restrictions or land consolidation.  Initial marketization 
measures are likely to have little visible impact; producers are already paying for 
health services.  The broader re-orientation of agricultural policy toward large-scale 
private actors may significantly affect small producers, but these changes (e.g. in 
regulatory policy and research programs) have little direct effect and thus are unlikely 
to provoke a response.  Even when mobilized, small producers are likely to exert less 
influence than pro-reform actors such as Chief Minister Naidu and private industries.  
Interventions that work within this path are more likely to meet with success as long 
as CM Naidu remains the state’s most powerful political actor. 
                                                 
84 If private actors failed to market private good services in an area, the document states, government would 
provide services “on a cost-recovery basis.” 
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CONCLUSION: STRATEGIC ENTRY POINTS, ACTORS, AND 
ALTERNATIVES 
This paper has analyzed political and economic factors affecting poor rural livestock 
producers in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa.  Based on that analysis, this section considers 
several strategies for enhancing the livelihoods of poor rural livestock producers.  
Possible sector-wide interventions include enhancing producers’ ability to act on their 
own behalf and improving producers’ access to common resources.  Strategies that 
focus more narrowly on animal health services, dairy, and small ruminants are also 
discussed.  Most strategies work within the framework of the recent reforms described 
in Section III.  These strategies are drawn from current policy debates and informants’ 
recommendations.  This section begins with discussion of broad interventions and then 
shifts to consider sub-sectoral initiatives for dairy and small ruminant producers. 
Enhancing producers’ ability to act on their own behalf 
As long as small livestock producers are not an organized and active interest group, 
livestock and related sector policies will be driven by other actors who may have 
conflicting interests.  Thus, building the capacity of producers to act on their own 
behalf is important to improving poor producers’ welfare.  However, prospects for 
livestock sector-based organizations are limited as long as livestock remains a 
secondary occupation or livelihood for most producers.  These producers are likely to 
focus on protecting and enhancing their primary livelihood, mobilizing only in 
response to urgent threats.  Producers who garner their primary livelihood from 
livestock are more likely to invest in livestock-focused organizations. 
The continued presence of patron-client relations in many locales poses an additional 
barrier to organization of producers in pursuit of their interests.  Poorer producers are 
often linked to wealthier households through obligations and favours.  Influential 
patrons may provide agricultural jobs, loans, or assistance in emergencies in exchange 
for political loyalty when it is demanded.  These patron-client ties can prevent poor 
producers from mobilizing to assert their interests individually (through policy-based 
voting) or collectively (in cooperatives, interest groups or social movements).  Clients 
also are unlikely to challenge their patrons for public office or to hold them 
accountable for poor management of local organizations.  Those clients who secure 
Panchayati Raj offices reserved for Scheduled Castes or Scheduled  Tribes may not act 
in the interest of those populations.  Patron-client ties can allow the privileged to 
control or monopolize the distribution of divisible goods—tractors, credit, extension 
services—and to ensure that their interests prevail when there is a conflict between 
their interests and those of their clients.  Patron-client relations appear to be more 
influential in Orissa than neighbouring Andhra Pradesh.85  Andhra Pradesh has had 
sustained peasant and radical movements that mobilized segments of the rural 
population, and contemporary observers describe rural Andhra Pradesh as highly 
politicized (Manor 2000; Powis 2003).  In contrast, Orissa is known for its “exceedingly 
quiescent civil society,” and the long dominance of a narrow elite (Manor 2000). 
Prospects for producer organization are also influenced by the logic of collective 
action (Olson 1965).  Participation in organizations imposes costs as well as providing 
benefits.  Decisions to lead or participate in associations are influenced by the 
perceived costs/benefit ratio and prospects for success.  While it should not be 
assumed that participation decisions depend on an individualistic, materialist calculus 
(Agrawal 2001; Ostrom 1990; Tarrow 1998; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 2000), such 
factors influence the development of associations and movements.  The costs and 
benefits of participation vary across individuals, locales, and states.  For example, the 
                                                 
85 This assessment is based on discussions with informants and the secondary literature. 
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calculus of those dependent on livestock income would differ from those for whom 
livestock income is supplementary.  Also, in places where livestock clients who join an 
association may lose their patron this cost would vary with the benefits provided by 
that patron.  This cost would be insignificant in places where patron-client relations 
are weak or absent. 
Given this context, three strategies have reasonable prospects for long-term success.  
One, external actors can support member-based dairy cooperatives and other 
producer associations such as sheep and goat rearers associations when and where 
they emerge, and can support poor producers involved in mixed organizations.  In 
places where local producers have taken steps to organize, external actors can 
facilitate information sharing and organizational development across locales, thereby 
reducing the cost of organization.  This strategy seems broadly relevant in Andhra 
Pradesh, where there are several networks of livestock producer and health service 
providers.  In Orissa, member organizations seem most common in the dairy sector. 
Two, actors can support or seek to catalyze the development of broad-based 
organizations in which small producers comprise a substantial share of membership.  
Small livestock producers often share other interests (e.g. as small farmers or 
agricultural labourers) and identities (e.g. as adivasis or dalits) that may be of higher 
priority.86  Broad-based organizations can provide a space in which livestock producers 
develop the skills to advocate on their own behalf and the base through which 
producers articulate their sectoral interests.87 
Three, actors can monitor and support local organizations that exert control over 
important resources.  As discussed, the Panchayati Raj institutions (PRIs) and user 
groups have the potential to be inclusive and democratic despite evident failures.  
Critical attention to local organizations increases the likelihood that poor producers 
will be able to participate effectively if they choose to do so.  Because the influence 
of patron-client relations, the strength of PRIs and user groups, and the role of small 
producers within local organizations vary substantially from place to place, efforts to 
enhance producers’ capacities are likely to produce uneven outcomes. 
Enhancing producers’ capacity and self-organization is an intensive and long-term 
effort.  Time is required to develop local knowledge and trust, and skills and 
relationships.  The resultant organizations, whether livestock-specific or broad-based, 
are likely to become politicized—to develop controversial positions and to form 
alliances with political leaders and parties.  Direct interventions in this area are best 
undertaken by domestically-based organizations that are committed to long-term 
involvement with the targeted constituency.  Nondomestic organizations usually 
cannot commit sufficient time and are vulnerable to expulsion if their work is 
perceived to conflict with state and national interests (Bratton 1989).  However, 
international organizations can route support to domestic organizations engaged in 
this work. 
Improving access to shared resources 
The potential of livestock-based interventions is sharply constrained by the 
environment within which producers work.  As long as poor producers lack sufficient 
arable land, they will depend on common and open access resources—village pastures, 
nearby forests, community waterholes—and therefore are affected by declines in 
resource conditions and vulnerable to restrictions on access.88  Land redistribution is 
                                                 
86 For example, some adivasis view the grazing and joint/community forest management conflicts as part of a 
broader struggle for preservation of their livelihoods that is taking place in multiple arenas—the courts, the 
bureaucracies, the forest. 
87 Social movement research shows that civic skills and existing networks provide important resources for issue-
specific advocacy (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). 
88 Purchase of inputs such as fodder would require expenditure of scarce resources 
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not a feasible near-term option, but any measures that improve the condition of 
common resources have the potential to enhance producers’ livelihoods. 
There are a number of central and state government, NGO, and donor initiatives 
underway to improve conditions on common lands, in forests, and in watersheds.  Pro-
poor producer interventions in this arena might involve raising awareness of 
producers’ needs and advocating on their behalf.  Because most government 
initiatives are led by departments other than animal husbandry, livestock producers’ 
interests are unlikely to be high priority.  The Andhra Pradesh Forestry Committee 
represents an important exception.  The representation of livestock producers on this 
committee, along with Forestry and Animal Husbandry officials, provides a venue 
through which producers can advocate livestock-friendly policies.  In other cases, 
NGOs are well situated to develop interventions that incorporate producers’ 
concerns,89 and donors can encourage governments to adopt these approaches.90  
Animal Husbandry officials can seek inclusion in initiatives that affect livestock 
producers.  Advocacy and producer organizations may be able to resist imminent 
threats—such as forest closure—but they generally lack capacity to continually monitor 
and proactively engage with these contextual issues.  The large number of initiatives, 
their dispersion across government departments, donors, and NGOs, and the lack of 
coordination among initiatives, poses a challenge to information collection and 
monitoring.  In the absence of greater coordination, donors can support monitoring 
efforts by sharing information and providing resources for monitoring. 
Encouraging & enabling pro-poor animal health sector reforms 
There are major livestock sector reforms underway in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, 
including marketization of the animal health services.  Some sector participants 
believe that the marketization of health services is inherently anti-poor; provision 
should be the responsibility of the state, not the private sector.  Whether these views 
are valid or not, it seems highly unlikely that their proponents have sufficient political 
leverage to prevent marketization.  Marketization fits within a liberal framework that 
enjoys support from leading political actors at the state (Andhra Pradesh), national 
(BJP), and international levels (international financial institutions and donors) 
(Pedersen, 2000).  There has not been broad popular mobilization against 
marketization, most likely because changes to date have had little impact on the 
ground.  Because producers were already paying for health services, the imposition of 
fees has not led to dramatic changes.  If more substantial changes—full privatization 
of health services—are implemented, their impact is likely to be felt only after the 
changes are close to irreversible.  Without mass unrest or a change of views among 
key actors, resistance is unlikely to succeed. 
If one accepts that some form of marketization will be implemented, then the focus 
turns to ensuring that reforms are implemented in a neutral or pro-poor fashion.  
Realizing this potential requires that the departments of animal husbandry develop 
new capacities and commitments—provision of preventative care, supervision of 
private practitioners, monitoring of private markets, targeting of resources towards 
the poor—in a resource-constrained environment.  There is some evidence of 
commitment to pro-poor reform within the animal husbandry bureaucracy of Orissa, 
but it exists only in pockets among high-level appointees and civil servants with strong 
ties to NGOs. Lower level civil servants are more likely to be concerned with retaining 
job security in the face of privatization.  Thus, pro-poor implementation requires 
building departmental capacity and developing incentives for pro-poor behaviour.   
                                                 
89 For example, Society for the Promotion of Wastelands Development-Andhra Pradesh tank restoration 
programs have encouraged villages to plant fodder trees near the bore wells.   
90 Many of the government initiatives receive significant support—technical assistance, grants, and loans—from 
international donor organization. 
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The incentive problem arises from the shift in health service provision towards semi-
public goods such as prevention and extension.  These services are likely to provide 
fewer private benefits to service providers than curative services,91 and thus providers 
have an incentive to focus on curative interventions.  This incentive problem is not 
insoluble—linking observable prevention efforts to promotions or bonuses is one 
option—but it needs attention.  Efforts to address this issue would work with the self-
interest of service providers, and thus may garner support from veterinarians and 
paraveterinarians.  
Marketization is a key component of the health service reforms planned for Andhra 
Pradesh and Orissa.  In this context, efforts to target resources towards poor 
producers should engage with geographic access to services.  At present, government-
subsidized services are distributed unevenly, and some areas have much less access 
than others.  Because the ill-served areas are unattractive in terms of local wealth, 
transport, and amenities, privatization of practice is unlikely to attract professional 
practitioners to these areas.92  Intervention in the form of subsidy (of private practice 
in poor areas) or targeting (of government practice) may be necessary.  One approach 
would be to direct the resources freed by reducing government subsidy of breeding 
(through the Livestock Development Agencies) and animal health services (through 
reduced hiring) toward access in underserved areas; this would require strong 
advocacy and departmental leadership.  One could assign a substantial share of 
remaining government veterinarians to these areas—providing continued job security 
in exchange—and/or provide a bonus to government or private veterinarians and 
paraprofessionals who work in these areas.  While government animal health 
practitioners may resist placement in underserved areas, it is not clear that these 
practitioners possess sufficient political strength to resist this change given clear 
commitment by departmental and political leadership.  Bilateral organizations and 
well-connected domestic pro-poor organizations should focus initial advocacy in this 
area. 
The interventions discussed above vary in the extent to which they are likely to 
encounter resistance.  Capacity building efforts would provide departments with new 
resources; these efforts may be welcomed.  Addressing the public goods incentive 
problem may not be a priority for government officials, but it is unlikely to pose a 
threat.  Efforts to influence marketization and accountability, on the other hand, may 
encounter resistance.  Influencing the reform process requires access to the 
bureaucracy.  Engaging with the incentive problems is probably least demanding; well-
developed ideas may be adopted by departments if they do not require substantial 
change.  Capacity building and implementation efforts also need continued 
involvement—a presence on the ground.  Those with access can provide state 
departments with resources to build civil servants’ skills in new areas, educate new 
appointees93 on reform issues and advocate pro-poor strategies, and conduct research 
on unanswered reform questions.  Departmental insiders and allied professionals, 
donors, and friendly or apolitical NGOs are likely to possess sufficient access to 
departmental staff and leadership.  Of these, bilateral organizations are most likely to 
have resources, an explicit commitment to the poor, and a presence on the ground, 
but it is not clear whether these organizations will remain involved for the long-term.  
Other international organizations are likely to lack sufficient local presence.  
Departmental leaders may have access but their involvement is unlikely to be long-
                                                 
91  As was discussed previously, service recipients’ willingness to pay depends on the individual (private) 
benefits they receive.  Semi-public goods provide collective and private goods, but recipients will consider only 
the private goods.  Curative services provide mostly private goods.  As a result, the market price for cures is 
likely to be higher than that for prevention. 
92 It is assumed that all practitioners will charge for their services.  However, service is likely to be less 
remunerative in very poor and remote areas. 
93 Appointments to the ministry and secretariat are driven by other considerations and this is unlikely to 
change.  Appointees are subject to frequent extradepartmental transfers 
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term; ministers and secretaries are subject to frequent transfer.  Other insiders, 
allied professionals and friendly organizations are less likely to prioritize the interests 
of poor producers, especially when these would impose costs on animal health 
professionals.  Where they exist, however, domestic organizations that possess both 
friendly relations with the state department and a commitment to the poor are well-
suited to encourage pro-poor reform.  Activist organizations—those that take public 
stances critical of the department—are likely to be excluded from the reform process, 
and thus limited to seeking leverage from outside.  Still, these organizations could be 
effective in putting poor producers’ issues on the reform agenda.  Orissa informants 
indicated that the department is relatively open, and some individuals and 
organizations have influenced reform in a pro-poor direction; this dynamic was less 
evident in Andhra Pradesh. 
Dairy sector: Reducing intervention and increasing competition 
To date, dairy sector interventions have focused on productivity (breed improvement) 
and cooperative marketing and processing.  Cross-breeding improvement efforts have 
met with little success.  Culling restrictions and low inputs of feed and fodder by poor 
producers pose daunting barriers. 
Past cooperative development efforts have created a useful infrastructure that 
performs well below its potential; poor producers who own dairy cows or buffalo 
garner some benefit from cooperative milk marketing.  Interventions that continue to 
focus on marketing and processing may benefit poor producers.  Two reforms have 
particular potential.  One, actors can pressure state governments to reduce their 
interference in the cooperatives so that members can hold these organizations 
accountable for their performance.  Implementation of the new cooperative laws 
would grant cooperatives substantial autonomy from government and accountability 
to their membership.  Member accountability does not guarantee performance, but 
managerial accountability to politicians inhibits performance. 
Two, actors can encourage increased competition in the formal dairy sector; 
competition from the informal sector is already a reality.  While the current situation 
has developed through a complex history, there is no obvious reason why cooperatives 
or private companies should enjoy a monopoly over milk collection, processing, and 
marketing.  Reforms implemented to date have reduced barriers to entry, but local 
monopolies over formal sector milk collection seem common.  It also seems to be the 
case that cooperatives do not compete for milk collection.  Allowing multiple 
cooperatives to function in a collection area could increase the performance focus of 
all cooperatives. 
Although reform would diminish opportunities for patronage, supporting these reforms 
is fairly uncontroversial.  These initiatives are consistent with a liberal market 
framework.  Private companies support reduced barriers to entry and the leading 
cooperative voices (NDDB and GCMMF) advocate reduced intervention.  Thus, actors of 
all sorts may be effective in this area.  International organizations and domestic 
organizations can advocate these reforms and provide technical support to those 
cooperative societies that decide to become independent. 
Small ruminant sector: Improving feed and fodder, researching 
markets & breeding 
Ownership of small ruminants is concentrated among the poor, and thus this area is an 
important one for pro-poor interventions.  The persistence and growth in goat rearing 
in the face of indifference and occasional hostility from policymakers provides clear 
evidence that these animals are profitable.  Informants indicated that scarce fodder 
and restricted access to health services impose substantial costs.  It is likely that small 
ruminant rearing is much less profitable than it could be.  Interventions that focus on 
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feed and fodder issues could have pro-poor effects.94  The central feed and fodder 
issue involves access to grazing lands.  Small, marginal, and landless producers depend 
heavily on common lands and forests; loss of access would threaten many livelihoods.  
However, these resources are both declining in condition and increasingly subject to 
access restrictions.  Policymakers have found it easier to exclude goats—owned by the 
poor—than cows.  Small ruminant rearers and advocates in Andhra Pradesh have 
engaged in defensive struggles on this issue, but external actors—especially donors—
could alter the content and tenor of common/state property debates by treating small 
producers, including sheep and goat rearers, as legitimate participants and insisting 
that donor-supported projects do not damage the welfare of poor producers. 
Efforts to improve the welfare of small ruminant rearers are constrained by lack of 
information on important issues.  Research in this area would contribute to future pro-
poor interventions.  Two important starting points are marketing and breeding.  
Marketing research could focus on the commodity chain.  There is little research on 
the commodity chain that links rural meat producers to regional and urban markets,95 
but there well be many places in which the linkages could be improved to the benefit 
of producers and consumers.  Breeding research could examine the status of 
indigenous breeds and consider the options for improvement.  Because there are no 
restrictions on culling, there may be greater potential for genetic improvement 
programs to succeed. 
The small ruminant policy environment in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa are quite 
different.  In Andhra Pradesh, as mentioned, the political environment has been fairly 
hostile to small ruminants, and rearers and advocates have engaged defensively.  
However, producers in the subsector are relatively well organized.  In contrast, the 
Orissa State Livestock Sector Policy acknowledges the importance of small animals and 
includes a brief section on meat animals.  The policy can provide a point of entry for 
actors who wish to address the issues raised above.  Interventions in Orissa will be 
constrained by the limited self-organization of small ruminant rearers.   
                                                 
94 Health service issues have been discussed.   
95 A substantial share of meat is consumed locally. 
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